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ABSTRACT
The grassroots spread of health and social movements is a highly important but largely 
understudied social process. Advocating on behalf of your beliefs to others violates the 
principles of Politeness Theory (Brown & Levinson, 1978) and therefore poses social risk. 
However, people do advocate for these beliefs, to a degree; as noted by Skitka (2002), people 
seem to select a limited number of positions to incorporate into their self-concept, choosing 
some to represent the self as a symbolic act. She argues that some of these attitudes most 
deeply ingrained and most motivating to act are those that are “moral mandates”.
Within this work, I discussed this construct of morality in the context of attitude 
structure (e.g. Teeny & Petty, 2018), attitude strength (e.g. Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005), 
observed behavioral intentions and effects (e.g. Cole Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008), the self 
(discussing implication of Skitka, 2002), and regulatory orientation (Zaal, Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, &
Derks, 2011), focusing the discussion and subsequent research on the latter two.
I then completed three empirical studies. In Study 1, I tested the factor structure of 
various operationalizations of morality, as well as attitude structure and strength, and their 
ability to predict outcomes previously associated with moral conviction. Moral conviction and 
moral acceptability were determined to be the most theoretically and predictively distinct 
conceptualizations, and evidence was found for basis being a significant interactor with 
morality in predicting the replicated outcomes.
In Study 2, I examined how morality interacts with perceived controversy and majority 
status, to elucidate the nature of morality as a counteractive force to social risk. I found that 
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majority significantly increased the positive effect of morality on advocacy, but also found 
significant 2- and 3-way interactions with attitude bases.
In Study 3, I experimentally tested the effects of perceived morality on both intentions 
and actual advocacy behavior, manipulating the perceived regulatory orientation (i.e. risk 
sensitivity) and belief in the attitude as central to the self-concept. Alone, these manipulations 
had no significant effect. However, significant effects were found in interaction with basis.
Conclusions focused on several keys areas. First, range restriction and potential fragile 
effects appeared to undermine consistency in determining significant effects. I strongly suggest 
the attitudes research field expand its use of stimulus sampling. on the nature of morality in 
interaction with basis. Different conceptions of morality interacted differently with cognitive 
and affective basis. Future work into the effect of morality on attitude outcomes should 
incorporate basis as a primary variable. Secondly, morality and high affect generally increased 
intent to advocate, however, at maximum levels the opposite was found, suppressing advocacy 
not necessarily through social pressures but likely an untenable amount of dissonance or a 
change in perceived utility. Finally, models utilizing frame manipulations left morality 
accounting for no significant variance. Future work should be done to determine the 
relationship between these frames and morality, as a mediating relationship remains a 
possibility.
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CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION
Humans are an unusually communicative species. Our higher brain function as well as 
our motor systems allow us to express an infinite variety of concrete and abstract thoughts 
(Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002). Communication is a key element of interpersonal bonding for
humans, and communicating shared experiences can be a significant source and method of 
maintaining crucial social ties (Davison, Pennebaker, & Dickerson, 2000; Duck, 1994).
But we do not always express experiences, thoughts, or opinions we know are shared. A 
student wears a candidate’s t-shirt during a controversial presidential campaign season. An 
entire family marches together in a protest of police action. A grandparent insists their 
grandchild eat their vegetables because “they’re good for you!” Someone hawks their goods to 
passersby on the sidewalk, hunting for eye contact and making their pitch. A young mother asks
her pregnant friend, “You’ve read what’s in vaccines, right?”
Attitudes are valenced positions toward an attitude object -- an abstraction of some 
person, thing, group, or idea (Fazio & Olson, 2003). Attitudes develop in part to help us identify 
advantageous resources and harmful threats (Katz, 1960; Smith, Bruner & White, 1956). 
Attitudes may be construed as a fixed thing you develop and add to over time, made up of 
beliefs (smoking introduces dangerous carcinogens to your lungs and increases your risk of lung
cancer), feelings (the thought of smoking grosses me out), and/or behaviors (I’ve never 
smoked; this tripartite model from Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960); alternatively, attitudes may be
seen as a group of cognitive, affective, or other internal elements that activate when you are 
confronted with the attitude object -- not a singular object, but those associations salient at the
time the attitude activates (Schwarz & Bohner, 2001). Some researchers dissect the different 
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‘pieces’ of attitude content and test effects separately, while others emphasize the overall 
judgment made based on the sum of them (Maio & Haddock, 2007), but it is generally accepted
that attitudes vary in how much they are founded on cognition, affect, and/or behavioral 
evidence.
The foundations of your attitude may be unique to you and your unique experience with
the attitude object. But, to the degree that one person’s evaluation of the attitude object is 
seen as agreeing with the evaluation of others, you may also say that attitudes are shared. 
Shared attitudes are often seen as socially bonding. Others who see the same things as 
desirable that we do are more likely to be like us, more likely to offer us relevant benefits 
through association, and less likely to be threats to us themselves (Byrne, 1961; Newcomb, 
1956; Riek, Mania & Gaertner, 2006). Finding or emphasizing shared attitudes (shared interests,
shared opinions, similar politics, etc.) is a common process when forming relationships 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Secord & Backman, 1964). Shared attitudes may be the
primary foundation for certain social groups, such as clubs, internet blogging communities, or 
religions. Threats to an attitude, even direct contradictory evidence, may even lead to stronger 
attitudes, or stronger affiliation with these attitude-based groups (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; 
Druckman, 2012; Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 1956).
Most communities impose some form of discouragement from expressing dissenting 
beliefs. Highly collectivistic communities who value group harmony may impose more severe 
restrictions than highly individualistic communities who value diversity (Jetten & Hornsey, 2014;
Hornsey, Jetten, McAuliffe, & Hogg, 2006). Members of more individualistic communities may 
be more lax, but still demonstrate changes in what attitudes they choose to express based on 
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their audience and perceived social norms (Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 
2002; Rutland, Cameron, Milne, & McGeorge, 2005).
Politeness Theory (Brown & Levinson, 1978) explains some of the pressures that may 
drive social control of attitude expression. They described two forms of threat to one’s face, or 
public image: positive face threat, which is a threat to one’s good image or social status, and 
negative face threat, a threat to one’s ability to remain self-directed and autonomous. 
Expressing an attitude counter to one’s audience’s own position may be viewed as both positive
and negative face threatening. My disagreement indicates that what you want is not wanted by
others (Holtgraves, 1992). Further, if I express my attitude in a way that implies I believe you 
should agree with me, or if I’m expressly trying to convince you to, I threaten your autonomy 
(O’Keefe & Shepherd, 1987).
We see some of the possible social backlash of advocacy in the outcomes of researcher 
persuasion on participant beliefs, public policy persuasion, or and public education. Although 
researchers and politicians may not be worried about how they personally are perceived by 
their listeners, the backlash to various arguments is an instance of the same backlash one might
face in advocating on a more personal level. Leathar (1981) discussed problems inherent in 
health publicity, which generally attempts to persuade viewers to avoid something enjoyable 
rather than obtaining something positive. Leathar described viewers as attributing classist 
attitudes to the message, resulting in perception of “official establishment material telling 
people what they should and shouldn’t do” (p.42). He also notes that this type of material 
causes anxiety, resulting in defensiveness. It’s possible that if persuasive content directly 
challenges the target’s own behavior, this may result in an ego-defensive rejection of the 
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source, which would be an undesirable outcome for most humans motivated by social 
acceptance.
Researchers have studied in depth how the listener reacts to counterattitudinal 
expression, but little has been done to study the source of persuasive behavior and the drivers 
that lead expressors to overcome social pressures against their attitude expression. This may be
in part an artifact of laboratory experiments, and that it is simpler to experimentally manipulate
a message and evaluate its effects than to observe participant-initiated behaviors in a realistic 
way. Yet, the factors that predict persuasive behavior are still in need of research.
The persuasive goals of commercial business are obvious. Some politically persuasive 
behavior has also been addressed: as part of a framework to describe political protest, Wright, 
Taylor, and Moghaddam (1990) noted that this act of persuasion may be individual, for the 
betterment of one’s own situation, or collective, for the betterment of one’s group. Yet, Gore 
and Rotter (1963) noted, “the apparent desirability of some social outcome is a poor predictor 
to the degree to which an individual will commit himself . . . This is particularly true when the 
social action runs counter to majority opinion and entails risk of rejection, failure, or some 
other punishment.“ They suggested that in addition to expectancies, social action may be 
motivated by personality (in their research, specifically internal vs. external locus of control). 
But little has been done to test the qualities of the attitude itself that may lead to one topic vs. 
another being the target of one’s passion beyond expectancies, and beyond personality. Even 
the most passionate activist seems unlikely to speak up in every social situation about every 
issue.
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While our own motivations are neither always accurately represented nor even always 
clear to our own selves (Ferguson, Hassin, & Bargh, 2008), the rhetoric of argument may shed 
light on its rationale. Within this paper, I will discuss the field of controversial health and public 
policy attitudes and make the argument that the language used to discuss them regularly ties 
the passion of the opinion to a sense of morality. The very rules of politeness discussed above 
are an issue of morality; manners may be part of what makes you a good person (Buss, 1999). 
In Western cultures, “strategic politeness reflects the paramount concern for . . . what is owed 
[emphasis added] to the individual” (Bargiela-Chiappini, 2003, p.14). As many health or public 
policy regulations affect the group, it may also group protection based morals (Janoff-Bulman &
Carnes, 2013; Haidt & Graham, 2007).
This line of research has practical applications. As our world becomes increasingly 
interconnected via technology, the paths of interpersonal influence become more numerous 
and more complex. As social movements spread, as myths are perpetuated, and as socially 
normative stances change, the content of shared knowledge and the direction of the public 
interest changes. For the sake of public health, understanding the spread of medicine-related 
attitudes is vital. For the sake of violence prediction, understanding how political beliefs morph 
and radicalize through social contact is valuable. And for the sake of public education, 
understanding how people in disparate areas acquire and pass on fact or misinformation may 
be key to countering it.
In the following sections I will define the scope of the current work, including the 
attitudes that will be covered as well as the geopolitical-social context for the targeted pool of 
participants. I will also discuss relevant theory and research needed to introduce research 
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questions for a series of studies that will expand on the existing field. Next, I will describe these 
studies in detail, proposing the methods and materials needed to test my research questions. 
Finally, I will discuss the implications (and limitations) of that work, and how it contributes to 
the greater body of social psychological theory.
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CHAPTER 2.    SCOPE OF THE CURRENT WORK
In attitude research, there are a wide variety of attitudes with a wide variety of content 
compositions or metacognitive features. To find reliable relationships during this first, 
exploratory stage of research, it is important to select a sampling of attitudes that are coherent.
Further, with an interest in influence intentions, I want to select an attitude sample with a high 
likelihood that at least some participants will express these intentions. As advocacy and 
persuasion are highly interesting for predicting social movements with wide-reaching political, 
economic, and public health effects, selecting controversial attitudes highly relevant to the 
current social atmosphere will offer more immediately meaningful implications from this 
research.
For all these reasons, I will constrain my studies to controversial topics in the public 
health and policy domains. These topics should generate a range of attitude content and 
metafactors, with at least some variation in the degree of motivation for interpersonal 
influence. Nevertheless, these topics may confound some aspects of the attitude content (e.g. 
belief that the science involved is authoritative) with individual difference (e.g. deference to 
authority). These issues of 1. how the relationships of attitude content and metafactors to 
influence intentions vary between attitude areas, and 2. how the influence of attitude content 
and metafactors may also be explained by personality, will have to be explored in future work. 
My work will also be constrained to attitudes that are controversial within the United States, to 
further focus the results to a relatively coherent and available participant pool. To generalize 
findings to a more general world population, a great deal of research into cultural effects and 
region-specific attitude content would need to be done.
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Furthermore, attitudes are culturally-bound, as attitude objects are imbued with a great 
deal of implication and association with culturally-specific context (Hui & Triandis, 1985; 
Crandall & Martinez, 1996). In order to limit the work to a group of individuals who will have a 
reasonably similar experience in a reasonably similar context with the public policies and public 
health issues discussed herein, I will limit my study to current United States residents. While 
this may limit generalizability of this work, it will generate useful insights about a population of 
hundreds of millions, and set the methodological foundation for future work into other 
populations.
On the Characteristics of United States Residents
The United States is a western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) 
society. Its citizens rely strongly on analytical reasoning and believe in equity and fairness 
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Spence (1985) argued that United States culture is 
individualistic, is focused on individual accomplishment, connects work and prosperity with 
moral worthiness, and believes in zero-sum competition. Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, 
and Lucca (1988) suggested an important distinction about American individualism: that 
Americans are more likely to suborn ingroup goals to their own personal goals. Further, despite 
the adage “You can be anything you want to be,” Americans are motivated to maintain the 
appearance of self-consistency and see the self as largely immutable (Heine, 2001).
On the Moral Characterization of Controversial Health and Public Policy Attitudes
A great deal of anti-health-science argumentation is morally-themed. In one study, 25% 
of assessed anti-vaccination websites used outright moral arguments, while 38% used implied 
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moral reasons by describing morally repugnant activities involved in vaccine development, such
as aborted fetuses, animal torture, and human experimentation (Kata, 2010). One French anti-
vaccine organization has stated, “We regard the obligatory nature of vaccination as a violation 
of moral and physical personal liberty, and of freedom of conscience” (Ligue Nationale pour la 
Liberté des Vaccinations, as quoted in Blume, 2006, p.633). Significant argument has been 
made about the balance between government control over health decisions or bodily 
autonomy in times of crisis versus the individual right to self-direction, often involving a 
discussion of the amount of risk the problem poses, and whether it merits a state of emergency
(Bayer & Colgrove, 2003). Morally-charged argument may even be religiously-themed, as moral 
communities may align with religious community (Graham & Haidt, 2010). In 2013, an outbreak 
of measles in the Netherlands was linked to an orthodox protestant community, and religious 
beliefs were given as a reason for non-vaccination in 93.6% of cases (Knol, et al., 2013). Further,
connecting morals and religion may lead to religious activities that reinforce one’s social 
identity as a holder of this attitude. Due to the evident connection of morality to some 
controversial health beliefs and government policy, this attitude domain is ideal for the current 
research.
Controversial Health and Public Policy Attitudes in the Current Research
The attitude topics I will cover are:
1. Childhood immunizations
2. Abstinence-only sex education in public schools
3. Use of the death penalty as a deterrent to crime
4. Genetically modified foods
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5. Laws preventing discrimination based on sexual orientation
6. Policies intended to reverse human-caused climate change
7. Additional gun control legislation
Childhood immunizations have been found to be both effective and safe in the 
prevention of communicable disease, yet there is a growing social movement against them that
allege that these immunizations are ineffective, contain unsafe ingredients, cause autism, et 
cetera (Hobson-West, 2007; Kata, 2012; Salmon, Dudley, Glanz, & Omer, 2015). 
Abstinence-only education correlates with higher rates of teenage pregnancy and no 
significant decrease in sexual activity (Kohler, Manhart, & Lafferty, 2008; Stanger-Hall & Hall, 
2011). However, a single study by Jemmott, Jemmott, & Fong (2010) was featured in a New 
York Times article (Lewin, 2010) that quoted proponents of abstinence-only education calling 
the research ‘game changing’ and stating that they hoped it would alter public policy, although 
Jemmott and colleague’s previous, highly-similar studies generally showed no significant or 
long-lasting change in sexual behavior for control (abstinence of sex-unrelated) interventions 
(e.g. Jemmott, Jemmott, & Fong, 1998).
The United States’ use of the death penalty is an outlier in developed nations, 
particularly as we continue to reserve (and exercise) the right to execute minors. “People give a 
wide variety of reasons when asked why they support the death penalty, including that the 
death penalty has a deterrent effect, [and] that it is cheaper than life imprisonment…” (O’Neil, 
Patry, & Penrod, 2004, referencing Bohm, 1987). Proponents appear to believe that the death 
penalty results in the punishment of the deserving and reduction of crime. However, in a review
of studies that examined supposed deterrent effects of the death penalty, Donohue and 
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Wolfers (2005) concluded that small sample sizes and inconsistent controls generate highly 
fragile findings, undermining any conclusions in favor of deterrence. Peffley and Hurwitz (2007) 
found that an argument against the death penalty, the “race gap” in which more black convicts 
are executed than white convicts, actually increased support of the death penalty in white 
respondents. Perlin (2016) argued passionately that some individuals in the legal system 
inappropriately facilitate conviction and execution of the mentally incompetent, or are 
passively complicit in continued misjustice.
Genetically modified foods, a modern evolution of an ancient practice, pose benefits for 
human nutrition, potential increases in the world food supply, and a decrease in the use of 
agrochemicals with little or no demonstrated negative effect on the consumer (Uzogara, 2000; 
Bouis, Chassy, & Ochanda, 2003; Godfray et al. 2010; Carvalho, 2006), but there is a strong 
market for non-GMO goods as well as proposed and current legislation that would either 
require GMO-containing goods to be labeled as such or restricted entirely from the 
marketplace (Baker & Burnham, 2001; Costa-Font, Gil, & Traill, 2008).
There is convincing evidence that sexual orientation is largely an inborn characteristic, 
yet in recent studies, up to 47% of LGBT workers reported workplace discrimination or 
harassment (Mallory & Sears, 2017; Sears & Mallory, 2011). In one recent study, 30% of the 
United States’ population agreed that homosexuality is a result of factors such as upbringing or 
environment (in contrast to something one is born with, both, neither, or no opinion), and 46% 
believe that new civil rights laws to reduce discrimination against LGBT people are not needed 
(Gallup, 2018).
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Human-caused climate change is at this point not only an agreed fact (Maibach, Myers, 
& Leiserowitz, 2014; Cook et al., 2013; Cook et al., 2016), but new research indicates that it is 
worse than originally estimated. A special report for policymakers revises the previous 2 
degrees Celsius goal for limiting global warming down to a lower threshold of 1.5 degrees in 
order to avoid serious effects to food supply, land use, and human conflict (IPCC, 2018). Yet, 
Dunlap, McCright, and Yarosh (2016), using data from ongoing Gallup polls, reported that only 
65% of the total public said that changes in the earth’s temperature over the last century are 
due to human activities, and when split by party only 43% of Republicans concur (p.9). Further, 
only 41% of the total public believe that global warming will pose a serious threat to them or 
their way of life in their lifetimes, to which a staggeringly low 23% of Republicans agree (p.11).
Mass shootings are an area of high concern in the United States recently (39% of 
Americans are Very worried or Somewhat worried that they or someone in their family will 
become a victim of a mass shooting; Gallup, 2018). Although poll respondents in the United 
States are putatively more and more supportive of stricter gun control legislation, the data 
continues to appear controversial: 57% are against laws that ban so-called assault rifles, 42% 
favor increased rates of gun carry by teachers in schools as a method of preventing shootings, 
24% oppose 30-day waiting periods for all gun sales, and 24% believe new gun control laws 
would not reduce the number of mass shootings in the U.S. at all (Gallup, 2018). In the most 
recent use of the question “Do you think having a gun in the house makes it a safer/more 
dangerous place to be?”, 63% responded “Safer” (Gallup, 2018, citing a poll run in 2014). 
However, much of this argument focused on the stranger danger of guns, and ignores more 
intimate threats. According to work by Siegel and Rothman (2016), rates of gun ownership 
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within a given state was strongly related to suicides by gun, and gun ownership was associated 
with higher rates of suicide by any means for male owners. Kellermann et al. (1992) took a 
more granular approach, finding via case-by-case analysis with matched pairs that even after 
controlling for psychotropic medication, prior arrest, drug and alcohol abuse, and education, 
the presence of a gun in the home posed an increased risk of suicide. Several of the same 
researchers took the lens to violent death of women (Bailey et al., 1997) and found that 
firearms in the home not only increased rates of suicide, but rates of homicide by spouse, 
intimate acquaintance, and close relatives. When states pass laws that restrict access to 
firearms for people subject to a restraining order, female partner homicides decrease 7% 
(Vigdor and Mercy, 2006). Finally, lest classism lead us to associate these numbers primarily 
with a risky-lifestyle population with arrest records and drug abuse, military veterans who kill 
themselves are between 1.3 and 1.6 times more likely than non-veterans to use a gun to do it 
(Kaplan, McFarland, & Huguet, 2009).
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CHAPTER 3.    ATTITUDE STRENGTH AND MORAL CONVICTION
What is Attitude Strength?
Attitude strength has been historically difficult to define; it is often used to refer to 
those variables that contribute to it (see the following section, What are attitude strength 
contributors?). However, most scholars agree that it is best understood as a construct resulting 
in consistent and coherent effects on an attitude’s lifecycle and outcomes. Strong attitudes are 
those which durable and impactful (Krosnick & Petty, 1995). Durability may be broken down 
into persistence, or consistency over an extended period of time (Boninger, Brock, Cook, 
Gruder, & Romer, 1990; Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992), and resistance, resisting attempts to change 
those attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995), while impactfulness may be broken down into being a 
significant influence on information processing (Jonas, Diehl, & Brömer, 1997; Brannon, Tagler, 
& Eagly, 2007), as well as a significant predictor of attitude-related behavior (Fazio & Zanna, 
1978). The question of strength itself is still unsettled -- whether it is a latent construct, 
effecting these characteristics, or whether it is an attitude heuristic used to indicate that it 
generates one or more of these effects (Krosnick & Petty, 1995, p.3; see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). 
Within this paper, I will use “strength” consistent with the second meaning (as a heuristic), and 
will refer to these symptoms of strength as “strength consequents.”
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Figure 3.1. Attitude strength as a latent construct.
Figure 3.2. Attitude strength as a heuristic.
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What are Attitude Strength Contributors?
The factors which have been found to increase attitude strength/precede attitude 
strength consequents are numerous. Some of the contributing factors studied thus far are a 
history of cognitive elaboration (Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), 
correctness (Petrocelli, Tormala, & Rucker, 2007; Fazio & Zanna, 1978), clarity or confidence 
(Petrocelli et al., 2007; Fazio & Zanna, 1978), importance (Krosnick, 1988; Pomerantz, Chaiken, 
& Tordesillas, 1995), relevance (Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994; Boninger, Krosnick, & Berent, 
1995), and extremity (Judd & Brauer, 1995; Bassili & Krosnick, 2000). See Krosnick and Petty 
(1995) for an overview.
Within this paper, I refer to attitude strength contributors as such because, although 
each can be shown to have the apparent effects strength might have on persistence, durability, 
information processing, and behavior, many of these contributors are only moderately to 
weakly related to each other (Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot 1993; also Krosnick,
Jarvis, Strathman, & Petty, 1994, as described in Krosnick & Petty, 1995), and their presence 
may not all be necessary for a given attitude to be strong.
Given this unusual relationship, it may be helpful to discuss these contributors in terms 
of their sufficiency and necessity (Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, & Rist, 1991; Thompson, 1994) for 
attitude strength. A given contributor, e.g. centrality, may be sufficient for attitude strength; 
that is, when centrality is high, strength is high. However, that contributor may not be 
necessary for attitude strength; when centrality is low, that does not support that the attitude 
is weak (Prislin, 1996). If these relationships were correct for every contributor to strength, that
would make these variables strength-sufficient conditions.
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However, if a weak attitude is observed when one of these conditions is extant, then the
condition is neither necessary nor sufficient. No single contributor is necessary, and a given 
contributor may not even be sufficient for attitude strength, but each contributes to the whole 
of the latent construct, which influences those outcomes we measure. Their relationship to 
each other remains fuzzy (e.g. centrality may lead to accessibility, or importance may lead to 
increased elaboration, or relevance may increase accessibility and importance) as they are 
aspects of a framework of focus, leaning upon and propping up each other (e.g. Bizer & 
Krosnick, 2001; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). Further, as lenses such as self-perception theory (Bem,
1972) and the inclusion of behavior as a part of attitude structure (Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960; 
Breckler, 1984) imply, the consequents of attitude strength (durability, etc.) may be observed 
by the actor, and feed back into strength contributors (elaboration, centrality, importance, etc.)
in a cycle of interdependence (Zanna, Olson, & Fazio, 1981; Chaiken & Baldwin, 1981).
What is Moral Conviction?
According to Skitka (2002), “people should be motivated to affirm their sense of self by 
selectively endorsing self-expressive moral positions or stands, or what will be referred to as 
moral mandates”. She characterizes moral mandates as a “special class of strong attitudes” 
(p.589). Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis (2005) introduced the concept moral conviction as that 
contributor to strength that distinguishes non-moral strong attitudes from moral mandates 
(strong attitudes with high moral conviction). They treat it as separate from other attitude 
strength contributors, referring to moral conviction as a reflection of attitude content, and 
other contributors as aspects of attitude structure (pp. 897-898, 914). This may put moral 
conviction on par with other aspects of attitude content, such as its basis in cognition, affect, or 
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self-observed behavior (Fabrigar & Petty, 1999; Crites, Fabrigar, & Petty, 1994; Rosenberg & 
Hovland, 1960; Bem, 1972). However, Skitka (2002) notes a relationship that may give moral 
conviction a particular power in guiding behavior; she notes that the motivation for self-
congruence (Steele, 1988) may make potential immorality a threat to one’s very identity, and 
strongly motivate action that will reaffirm their moral self-perception. Although the notion of 
identity will be discussed in more detail later in this paper, within the framework of social 
identity theory (Tajfel, Turner, Austin, & Worchel, 1979; Turner & Oakes, 1986), it follows that 
perceived immorality in a group member could also pose a threat to one’s identity and 
motivate attempts at social influence.
However, the use of moral conviction and moral mandate interchangeably (Skitka et al., 
2005) is interesting, as it emphasizes Skitka’s repeated claim that all moral mandates are strong
attitudes, although not all strong attitudes will be moral mandates (Skitka, 2002; Skitka & 
Houston, 2001). This supports the assertion that moral conviction is not simply another attitude
strength contributor, existing at a parallel level in conjunction with the others. The rules of 
causality suggest that it may actually be a source of those structural strength contributors, 
causing an increase in structural contributors, although this would not rule out the possibility 
that moral conviction may simultaneously offer a separate, direct effect on attitude strength 
consequents (that is, provide an indirect effect via an increase in a strength contributor(s) in 
addition to a direct effect on the consequent). Potential support for this theory could be found 
in Luttrell, Petty, Briñol, & Wagner (2016), as simply perceiving an attitude to be morally 
founded generated attitude strength consequents. This could be due to morality existing a 
causal influence on attitude strength contributors, although it is also possible that, as an 
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attitude must be strong to have high moral conviction, the correlation between the two takes 
the perceiver from perceived morality to perceived strength contributors (e.g. perceived 
elaboration, Barden & Petty, 2008) to greater strength consequents.
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CHAPTER 4.    ADVOCACY AS AN EFFECT OF ATTITUDE STRENGTH AND MORAL CONVICTION
A Cohesive Definition of Advocacy
Before addressing advocacy effects in the specific, I would like to define some terms as I 
will use them. Although I have thus far referred to “persuasive behavior” to orient us within the
domain of research as it is typically labeled, in order to clarify the behavior I am most interested
in I will here redefine persuasion itself as something more specific (that which is directly 
intended to alter a specific target’s view, and not behavior that may affect views through 
normativity, enforced behavior, or other indirect paths).
Terms as I use them include:
A source (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; Wilson & Sherrell 1993) is an 
individual, group, or entity who is the persuader, the expressor, or the source of 
interpersonal communication or influence.
A target (Friestad & Wright, 1994; Kirmani & Campbell, 2004; Briñol, McCaslin, & Petty, 
2012) is an individual who is the persuadee, the listener, or the target of a source’s 
interpersonal communication or influence goals.
Attitude expression (Powell & Fazio, 1984; Roese & Olson, 1994) or opinion sharing 
(Paridon, 2004) is any verbal or behavioral expression of one’s attitude, irrespective of 
the audience’s perception of, acknowledgement of, or agreement with that attitude.
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Attempted persuasion (Friestad & Wright, 1994; Williams, Fitzsimons, & Block, 2004) or 
persuasive behavior (Slaughter, Peterson, & Moore, 2013) is any behavior intended to 
alter the content or other properties of the target’s attitude. It requires that the target’s 
attitude or attitude properties are known or believed by the persuader to be different or
potentially different from what is desired, as persuasion is fundamentally a process of 
change (O’Keefe, 2002).
Advocacy is activity that is intended to proliferate one’s attitude, or to proliferate 
behavior that supports one’s attitude (Waisbord, 2009). Advocacy does not require 
attempted persuasion. It may be motivated by goals of raising salience (“awareness”; 
Niederdeppe, Bu, Borah, Kindig, & Robert, 2008) or normalization (Jackson, Bailey, & 
Foucault Welles, 2017; Chase, 2003), in addition to explicitly persuading the target. 
Persuasive intent should increase face theat.
Persuasion may or may not involve attitude expression. For example, I may persuade 
someone to adopt an attitude by making that attitude seem normative, without ever implying I 
hold that attitude myself. Advocacy may or may not have the goal of persuading a disagreeing 
target. I may advocate simply to reinforce/maintain my self-image (a value-expressive function, 
Katz, 1960, or a method of implied social comparison, Fein & Spencer, 1997), reinforcing a 
group identity I associate with that attitude (Fraser, Clayton, Sickler, & Taylor, 2009), or 
highlighting similarities and/or differences between I and my listener to evoke different group 
membership boundaries (Ghaziani, 2011). However, advocating always involves attitude 
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expression, generally one’s own. It is possible to advocate for a third party’s attitude, although 
in many cases the target attributes the attitude to the source anyway (Jones & Harris, 1967; 
Tetlock, 1985).
Contrary to what the name may imply, collective action is not only action taken as a 
group, but any action taken as a member of a group for that group’s good (Van Zomeren, 
Postmes, & Spears, 2008, 2011; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990) -- in this way, it is simply 
advocacy with a specific salient identity with a specific type of goal.
Advocacy could be classified among a number of potentially meaningful dimensions. It 
may vary by the degree of individuality, social distance, intent to influence, social acceptability, 
and behavioral control. Within this work, I will not attempt to address all of these axes. Rather, 
as my interest is in overcoming pressures against advocacy, I have selected advocacy behavior 
that is individual, avoiding diffusion of responsibility, and at close social distance, heightening 
the face threat.
Advocacy as an Effect of Strength Contributors
Attitude strength contributors have been found to predict a number of advocacy 
behaviors. Visser, Krosnick, and Simmons (2003) found that attitude importance and attitude 
certainty increased the likelihood of attempts to persuade others, and importance predicted 
voting behavior. Intent to vote and sign a petition are commonly used in behavioral intention 
measures of attitude strength; Barden and Petty (2008) demonstrated that simply the belief 
that one has thought a lot about a topic (a heuristic measure of the elaboration strength 
contributor) was enough to significantly increase these. The effect of attitude certainty on 
advocacy is stronger when the attitude-holder is presented with weak arguments on behalf of 
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their position -- those who originally believed they could not argue effectively for their side 
advocated more after seeing arguments even worse than theirs (Akhtar, Paunesku, & Tormala, 
2013).
Uncertainty has its own interesting effect on advocacy; although people with moderate 
certainty have low intent to advocate, intentions rise in individuals with low certainty 
(Cheatham & Tormala, 2017). This is consistent with my earlier discussion of advocacy as a self-
affirming or group-identity-affirming activity. Cheatham and Tormala dissolved the uncertainty 
effect on advocacy with a self-affirmation intervention. Further, in an analysis of the content of 
argumentation, they discovered that the way in which low-certainty individuals advocate 
appeared to be a method of information-gathering, rather than to appear more certain or to 
self-persuade (p.14).
Cheatham and Tormala (2015) explored the difference between persuasion intentions 
and sharing intentions in advocacy. They demonstrated that attitude correctness and 
confidence together predict sharing intentions, but that only correctness predicted persuasion 
intentions. 
Teeny and Petty (2018) brought more nuance to the definition of advocacy in these 
experiments by drawing a distinction between advocacy that is spontaneous (proactive) and 
advocacy that is requested (reactive). In their work, they operationalized advocacy as simply 
sharing one’s opinion with another person when asked or unasked, an individualistic approach 
with small social distance. However, rather than studying typical attitude strength contributors, 
they examined the relationship of attitude structural bases, cognitive and affective. After 
correlational work as well as an experimental manipulation of perceived basis, the authors 
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concluded that an affective basis or perceived affective basis was more predictive of 
spontaneous advocacy than a cognitive basis. The authors suggested the effect could be related
to the greater energy and spontaneity of behavior that strong affect engenders.
Advocacy as an Effect of Moral Conviction
Skitka and Bauman (2008) connected the strength of moral conviction on political topics
and candidates to rates of voting and intentions to vote, even when controlling for attitude 
extremity. In line with Teeny and Petty’s finding that an affective basis predicts advocacy, Skitka
and Bauman note, anecdotally, that morally-colored attitudes generate strong emotions, even 
overriding competing emotions, in response to seeing others or one’s own violation of their 
principles (pp.32-33). Although only implicitly, they seem to attribute some of the motivating 
force of moral conviction to take action to be the negative consequences of not doing it by 
referring to the negative emotions of not acting when your morals dictate you should.
Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) explored an integrative social identity model 
of collective action. Using data from a number of studies into group-disadvantage-related 
predictors of collective action measures, the authors categorized predictors according to three 
socio-psychological perspectives, termed injustice, efficacy, and identity. Efficacy aligns to 
perceived behavioral control, a long theorized interactor with attitude in predicting behavioral 
outcomes (e.g. Theory of Planned Behavior: Armitage & Conner, 2001; Ajzen, 2011; Ajzen, 
1991; see figure 4.1). Identity aligns well with the attitude strength contributors of importance 
and relevance. The most interesting domain is injustice, which I would argue is the enactment 
of threat. Further, in a moment reminiscent of Skitka and Bauman’s musings on the role of 
emotion in moral attitudes, Van Zomeren et al. noted that affective injustice and politicized 
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identity were more strongly predictive than non-affective injustice and non-politicized identity. 
In later work (2012), they demonstrated that moral conviction predicted collective action 
intentions (endorsing items like ‘I would participate in a demonstration against an increase in 
tuition fees’ and ‘I would like to sign a petition against this issue’) and collective action (signing 
a Greenpeace petition), mediated by identity, efficacy, and group-based anger (in response to 
injustice), having replaced the incitement of the emotion with the emotion itself. This work is 
consistent with the theory of moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990), as group identity results in the 
dehumanization and negative treatment of out group members. This is further in line with 
Intergroup Emotions Theory, as salient group identity leads to assessment of events based on 
implications to the group, and triggers group emotions (Mackie, Smith & Devos, 2000; Mackie, 
Smith, & Ray, 2008).
 Zaal et al. (2011) also linked moral conviction to collective action, but specifically for 
individuals with prevention and not promotion orientation. While experimentally manipulating 
orientation, they controlled for perceived importance in an attempt to isolate moral conviction 
from other strength contributors. However, in Chapter 5 of this work it will become relevant 
that for Zaal and colleagues, promotion- and prevention-orientation were conceptualized as 
oriented toward what one wants to do vs. what one believes one should do (p. 678), which is 
perhaps a narrow view of these regulatory focus constructs. Furthermore, the manipulation of 
regulatory focus came before the check of moral conviction strength, which may have 
confounded the results for people who are sensitive to injunctive pressure, even perhaps 
heightening their belief that a given attitude is one of deep moral concern. However, the 
authors tested the effect of moral conviction in light of hostile and benign (they say benevolent)
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forms of collective action, finding that moral conviction appears to override the generally 
negative reaction to hostile action.
Figure 4.1. The Theory of Planned Behavior, with an integration of the Tripartite Model of Attitudes.
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CHAPTER 5.    THE RELATION OF MORAL CONVICTION TO THREAT
Moral Mandates are Concerned with What One Ought and May be Motivated by
Threat
Stitka and colleagues have argued that moral conviction lends to an attitude a moral 
mandate (Skitka & Houston, 2001; Skitka & Mullen, 2002; Mullen & Skitka, 2006). One might 
call this mandate the ‘ought’ or ‘should’ (see Anscombe, 1958, p.5); it is a difficult concept to 
isolate, but I aver that “it would be good for everyone to do X” is significantly different in 
meaning from “everyone has a responsibility to do X”, the second of which is the ought which is
meant here. 
Zaal, Saab, O’Brien, Jeffries, Barreto, & Van Laar (2015) identified that politicized identity
not only predicted collective action, but also negative emotions toward people who disagreed; 
this was mediated by the degree to which participants believed that supporting the goal was 
morally obligatory. Zaal, Van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, & Derks (2012) found that prevention 
orientation (which appeared to make moral conviction more salient, Zaal et al., 2011) had high 
willingness for collective action when the goal was of high importance, even if achieving the 
goal was unlikely. The authors describe prevention focus interacting with what individuals 
under that focus believe is “necessary”. 
In sum, prevention orientation has been characterized as a focus on obligation. 
Obligation comes with the implication that to not do something is wrong, resulting in negative 
consequences. These consequences pose a threat to the attitude holder. This interpretation 
aligns with the original characterization of the promotion/prevention orientation as a general 
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principle that explained phenomena such as the hedonic principle -- i.e. humans approach 
pleasure and avoid pain (Higgins, 1998).
When we say one ought to do something, it could be associated with one of several 
belief schemas:
1. It would be good to do X.
2. It would be good to not do X.
3. It would be bad to do X.
4. It would be bad to not do X.
5. It would make you a good (or better) person to do X.
6. It would make you a good (or better) person to not do X.
7. It would make you a bad (or worse) person to do X.
8. It would make you a bad (or worse) person to not do X.
The distinction between statements 1-4 and 5-8 is one of essentialism, the core concept 
of the fundamental attribution error/correspondence bias (Ross, 1977; Jones & Harris, 1967; 
Gilbert & Malone, 1995). This bias has been found to be strongly rooted in United States culture
(Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Morris & Peng, 1994). If morality is related to judgments of 
obligation that may have implications for your fundamental worthiness as a human, it follows 
that moral attitudes would be, in a word, fundamental, and uniquely predictive of behavior.
Highly Moral Attitudes May Relate to Regulatory Orientation and to the Self
When ought self-guides are active, participants express an affinity for avoidant self-
regulatory strategies (Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994). Ought goals, or duties and 
responsibilities with a prevention focus, related more to arousing emotions (e.g., agitation or 
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fear) than did ideal goals (Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997; Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 
1986). This could be explained by cognitive dissonance theory.
Cognitive dissonance theory states that cognitive dissonance is an aversive psychological
state generated when one holds two incongruent beliefs (Festinger, 1962, 1957). When the 
dissonance is experienced negatively (an aversive state, as cognitive dissonance is typically 
characterized), it motivates the individual experiencing it to make the two beliefs less 
incongruent (Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Elliot & Devine, 1994).
To reduce dissonance, you might use a number of strategies, for example, changing one 
of the dissonant cognitions (Festinger, 1957), justifying one of the dissonant cognitions with 
additional cognitions that are consistent with the other (Festinger, 1957), trivializing one of the 
dissonant cognitions (Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995), denying responsibility or choice in 
the matter (Gosling, Denizeau, Oberlé, 2006), et cetera. In Skitka et al. (2005), participants 
preferred to distance themselves from those who disagreed with their moral mandates -- 
holding a belief in their attitude, and simultaneously holding another belief that said they had 
something in common (physical or social connection) with someone who disagreed with their 
attitude, they chose to change the second belief by decreasing the amount they had in 
common. The same effect was found by Cole Wright et al. (2008), especially for moral attitudes 
with an associated strong emotional response.
Further, there is evidence that some elements of the self are more central than others 
(Sedikides, 1995; Markus & Kunda, 1986). Like attitudes, central conceptions are more 
elaborate and chronically salient (Markus & Kunda, 1986); they are in essence self-attitudes. 
Skitka (2002) has argued that people seem to select a limited number of positions to 
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incorporate into their self-concept (making them “an expression of their commitment”). These 
appear to be more symbolic self-symbols than fully rational representations of beliefs, as “Once
an expression of their commitment to a specific value has been identified, people may feel little
pressure to develop other attitudes around that same value” (p.589).
Centrality has been studied as an attitude strength contributor (Prislin, 1996). Honkanen
and Verplanken found that centrality could mediate the relationship between values and 
behavior, including when subjects were under enhanced self-focus (2002; 2004). However, 
Sherman and Gorkin (1980) found that dissonance-alleviating behavior increased in response to
hypocrisy when the attitude was more central. The relationship between centrality, or the 
essentialism of an attitude to the self, and a heightened aversive state brought on by violation 
of the ought self, more salient with prevention orientation, could be interactive.
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CHAPTER 6.    THEORETICAL FOCUS OF THE CURRENT WORK
Although the above review of literature have raised a number of interesting questions, 
within the course of this work I will limit the scope of my questions.
Firstly, Dwyer (2009) discussed the many ways researchers have discussed morality, and
argued convincingly that the distinctions between acceptability, permissibility, wrongness, and 
okayness, are meaningful. Rohan (2000) similarly argued that the language used for ‘values’ 
suffers from an epidemic of inconsistency. In Chapter 5, I have laid out a number of statements 
that vary on approach and avoidant orientations, as well as essentialism (e.g. “It would make 
you a good (or better) person to not do X.”). In order to lay the foundation for a coherent 
discussion of any relationship between moral judgments and advocacy, I intend to test these as 
alternate phrasings to typical measures of morality/moral conviction, in order to better explain 
how moral judgments are or are not tied to threat as well as the self- or world-concept.
Secondly, my core question is that potential relationship between morality and 
advocacy. Advocacy is a specific subset of behavior with specific goals, with a high degree of 
social risk. More importantly, any given person likely picks and chooses between multiple 
attitudes, some of which they advocate for and some of which they don’t. Thus, I believe it 
holds that there should be some relationship between metafactors of an attitude (content, 
strength, and/or morality) and the intent to engage in advocacy on behalf of it. I intend to test 
these metafactors to determine which factors have the strongest relationship to advocacy 
intentions.
Finally, morality has been found to interact with regulatory focus, and in my discussion 
of the ought self I have connected it to the target’s own self-concept. In Study 3, I will 
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experimentally test the effects of perceived morality on both intentions and actual advocacy 
behavior, manipulating the perceived regulatory orientation (i.e. risk sensitivity) and belief in 
the attitude as central to the self-concept. This experimental test will allow me to see effects 
my sample may otherwise obscure as well as give evidence for possible causality.
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CHAPTER 7.    STUDY 1
Study Goals
In this study I will try to better understand how approach and/or avoidance, and 
essentialism contribute to perceptions of morality, as well as whether they better predict the 
consequents of moral conviction that have been demonstrated before. I hypothesize that 
avoidance (perceived negative effects of engaging in or endorsing something) and more 
essentialist frames (those with greater implications for one’s goodness or badness as a person) 
will better predict holistic measures of morality than approach and non-essentialist frames. I 
also predict this same pattern in their prediction of the effects of moral conviction I will be 
replicating.
Design
This was a semi-naturalistic approach. In this study I compared a number of potential 
measures of moral conviction in their ability to predict outcomes that have been linked to 
moral conviction before:
1. Endorsement of hostile collective action in service of attitude-consistent outcomes (Zaal,
Van Laar, Ståhl, & Ellemers, 2011)
2. Intolerance of dissenting others (Cole Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008)
By testing these measures simultaneously I intended to highlight which measures 
clustered together, which measures explained the most variance, and which combinations of 
measures might most accurately reflect the attitude quality that causes the effects of moral 
conviction.
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As attitudes toward a given attitude object vary between individuals, and attitudes 
toward various attitude objects vary within an individual, I expected to see sufficient variation 
in the attitude measures to observe their predictive value on the measured outcomes, while 
gaining benefit from dealing with these attitudes as they exist in reality (i.e. not experimentally 
manipulated).
Each participant responded to several attitude objects from the pool defined in Chapter 
2. While much attitude research uses a single attitude to test processes, the question of what 
makes an attitude particularly worth fighting for, above and beyond similar attitudes, suggests 
that some range of attitude objects should be used. The assumption that these attitudes 
specifically will generate variation in participant response is supported by Cole Wright et al.,  
(2008) who had participants code a very similar set of attitudes in the same domains of health, 
minorities, public policy, and the environment. Sixty participants classified 40 provided issues as
nonmoral or moral. Of those 40, 39 issues evoked disagreeing classifications. Only “music 
preferences”, one of the most neutral issues presented, was rated by all participants as 
nonmoral. All other attitudes were classified as a moral issue by 2 (“speed limit” and “exercise”)
to 90 (“rape”) percent of participants. Some of the most similar attitudes and their nonmoral 
and moral classification percentages are given in table 7.1. As the authors used a simple binary 
classification problem, I expected variation on a continuous moral scale like those I will be using
to generate increased variation, as people who may be unwilling to commit to the category 
they feel is more marked may be willing to render a less polarized judgment and use an 
intermediate interval.
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Table 7.1. Subset of moral classification percentages given in Cole Wright et al., 2008 (p.1465)
Nonmoral Moral
Sexual promiscuity 79 21
Death penalty 72 28
Reduction of 
pollution/consumption
87 13
Homosexual marriage 76 25
Women/minorities given 
preferential consideration
79 21
Preserve/protect 
environment
76 25
Owning guns/dangerous 
weapons
96 3
Participant Source
Participants were recruited online via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) where they 
were given monetary compensation for participation. Participants were required to be age 18 
or older and be current residents of the United States. Participants were also intended to be 
barred from participation in this study if they have completed another study in this series 
(Study 2 and/or 3); in fact, collection for this study closed before either Studies 2 or 3 began.
In 2014, Paolacci and Chandler reviewed MTurk as a source of psychological experiment 
participants. They noted the participants were “younger (about 30 years old), overeducated, 
underemployed, less religious, and more liberal than the general population (Berinsky, Huber, 
& Lenz, 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010; Shapiro, Chandler, & Mueller, 2013). Within 
the United States, Asians are overrepresented and Blacks and Hispanics are underrepresented 
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relative to the population as a whole.” Heen, Lieberman, and Miethe (2014) compared several 
respondent services and found that MTurk had a racial profile most similar to the actual United 
States population, although still under-representative especially in the case of latino 
respondents. Nearly half of Heen et al.’s MTurk respondents were under the age of 30.
MTurk’s participant pool has been compared to other sample services as well as 
standard university student pools. Kees, Berry, Burton, and Sheehan (2017) found that MTurk 
participants were significantly (and to a large degree) more likely than typical student samples 
or other professionally gathered samples to pass an instructional manipulation check that relied
on careful attention. In contrast, Goodman, Cryder, and Cheema (2013) found that MTurk 
participants showed greater inattention compared to traditional samples, as well as lower 
extraversion and self-esteem, and a higher likelihood of internet searching for correct 
responses in the case of questions with factual answers. However, the same research noted 
that MTurk participants demonstrated the same decision-making biases as standard samples, 
with similar effect sizes. Hauser and Schwarz (2016) found that MTurk participants were more 
attentive than undergraduate samples, perhaps because they had learned to be attentive due 
to the use of instructional manipulations in a large number of MTurk tasks. Shapiro, Chandler, 
and Mueller (2013) found rates of clinical and subclinical symptoms of depression, anxiety, and 
trauma exposure in MTurk participants that were similar to rates in the general population. 
They do note what may be over-reporting of symptoms, which may be due to motivations to 
meet screening criteria, or to provide answers the participant believes the researcher wanted. 
They also suggest screening IP addresses for locations outside the United States when one is 
trying to reach a U.S. population.
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This study followed several recommendations to maximize data quality from this source.
Firstly, the study content does not require factual answering, only answering that is subjectively
truthful. Secondly, I utilized MTurk’s option to screen by location for United States residents 
only. Thirdly, I used an explicit check of attention. This will be discussed in the procedures and 
measures below.
Participants
In total I collected responses from 200 participants after exclusions (see Attention 
Check). 88 participants self-reported as female, 110 as male. Self-reported age ranged from 19-
74, with a mean of 37.09. 140 self-reported their race as white, 40 as black, 10 as Asian, 3 
Indian American or Alaskan Native, 3 as multiracial, and 4 as other. 32 participants described 
their ethnicity as latino/a. Regarding highest attained level of education, 64 participants had 
completed no more than high school, 103 had completed an Associate’s or Bachelor’s degree, 
and 32 reported post-baccalaureate academic or professional degrees. 37 participants said they
were currently a student.
Procedures
After giving consent, participants were redirected to an online survey composed of 
several questionnaires/measures. First, they responded to a questionnaire about their attitudes
toward various topics, covering attitude valence, bases, strength contributors, and morality. 
Only valence and bases were measured in the listed order; all other measures were presented 
in random order. Valence direction order (positive or negative valence first) were 
counterbalanced between participants. Questions referred to only one attitude object until 
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these measures were complete; blocks of questions in reference to each attitude object were 
randomly presented. Second, participants answered questions about their intentions to 
advocate on behalf of those attitudes or to persuade others to the same belief in hypothetical 
situations with various audiences, for the topics “childhood immunizations”, “abstinence-only 
sex education in public schools”, and “use of the death penalty as a deterrent to crime”. Third, 
participants completed several questionnaires measuring individual differences in trait face 
concerns, social self-efficacy, and Big 5 personality dimensions. Fourth, participants rated their 
level of endorsement to a series of possible collective actions, both benevolent and hostile, in 
support of the given issues, as well as their level of acceptance of others who disagreed with 
them on the given issues.  Fifth, participants completed a demographic survey. Participants 
ended their participation with a debrief of the study’s purpose and contact information for
Figure 7.1. Order of measures within Study 1, moving down each column before proceeding to the next node.
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follow-up or questions about the study. Participation was expected to take approximately 20 
minutes. Participants were paid $1 for the task. As Mechanical Turk does not allow prorated 
compensation, in the case of an incomplete task, participants were asked to contact the 
researcher to be paid according to each quarter of the total questions completed, rounded 
down; no participants requested partial payment.
Measures
Attitude Valence
Participants read instructions prior to responding to this measure. They were told that 
they would be asked about their positive and negative feelings toward a specific topic. First, 
they were asked to consider only their (for example) NEGATIVE thoughts and feelings about the
issue, given an explanation of attitudes that normalizes both ambivalence and non-
ambivalence, and asked to ignore any positive thoughts or feelings that they have. Then they 
rated the magnitude of their negative thoughts and feelings on a 7-point scale from no negative
thoughts or feelings to maximum negative thoughts and feelings. They then received similar but
inverted instructions for positive thoughts and feelings. This ordering occurred for half of 
participants; the other half received positive first and negative second. However, the order was 
consistent within participants for all attitude topics. This method is a minor adaptation of a 
reactions questionnaire used by Priester and Petty (1996) as a measure of attitude and 
ambivalence.
Attitude Bases
Participants rated their belief in a cognitive and/or affective basis for the given topic. 
These were rated on a 7-point scale, from not driven at all by emotions/beliefs to completely 
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driven by emotions/beliefs. Similar measures have been used before in other studies of 
attitudes (e.g. Crites, Fabrigar, & Petty, 1994) and reflect our understanding of attitude bases as 
falling in or across cognitive and affective domains (Edwards, 1990; Rosenberg, Hovland, 
McGuire, Abelson, & Brehm, 1960).
Attitude Strength Contributors
Participants were asked about several attitude strength contributors: clarity, 
correctness, importance, relevance, and prior elaboration. On a 5-point scale of Not ____ at all, 
Slightly _____, Moderately _____, Very _____, and Extremely _____, participants answered the 
following questions (all wordings are mild variations of those used in the given citation):
1. Overall, how certain are you that the attitude you just expressed toward 
______________ is really the attitude you have? (Petrocelli, Tormala, & Rucker, 2007)
2. Overall, how confident are you that your attitude toward ______________ is the right 
attitude to hold? (Petrocelli, Tormala, & Rucker, 2007)
3. Overall, how important to you is your attitude toward _______________? (Boninger, 
Krosnick, & Berent, 1995)
4. Overall, how likely do you believe the issue of ________________ is to affect you 
personally? (Dean et al. 2012)
5. Overall, how deeply have you thought about the issue of ______________? (Tormala & 
Petty, 2004)
41
Morality
The following are a number of holistic and granular measures of morality.
Moral conviction
This measure is composed of 4 questions that ask to what extent the participant’s 
attitude is a reflection of [their] core moral beliefs and convictions, connected to [their] beliefs 
about fundamental right and wrong, based on moral principle, and a moral stance, measured 
on a 5-point scale of not at all, slightly, moderately, much, and very much (Skitka & Morgan, 
2014). This scale has been reported to return a Cronbach’s alpha of .93 to .99 (Morgan, 2011).
Non-essentialist promotion and prevention
This measure was composed of the first 4 questions presented in Chapter 5, wherein 
participants will rate their agreement with the following statements on a 7-point scale from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree:
It would be good to support X.
It would be good to not support X.
It would be bad to support X.
It would be bad to not support X.
These questions were written to encapsulate a bimodal affect system (see Cacioppo & 
Berntson, 1999) in the context of promotion- and prevention-oriented self-regulation (see 
Higgins, 1998). However, they put the focus on the action, and not the outcome as it may 
reflect on the self of the actor.
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Essentialist promotion and prevention
This measure was composed of the latter 4 questions presented in Chapter 5, wherein 
participants will rate their agreement with the following statements:
It would make you a good (or better) person to support X.
It would make you a good (or better) person to not support X.
It would make you a bad (or worse) person to support X.
It would make you a bad (or worse) person to not support X.
These were written similarly to the previous four, but recast the goodness and badness 
of the act in terms of self-oriented outcomes.
Moral acceptability/permissibility
This is a single item taken from Schnall et al. (2008), measuring morality on a 7-point 
spectrum scale of acceptability and permissibility, from Extremely immoral to Perfectly okay. A 
score near the Perfectly okay half of the scale would indicate something both permissible and 
acceptable, a score near the center of the scale would indicate something permissible but not 
acceptable, and a score near the Extremely immoral end of the scale would indicate something 
impermissible and unacceptable.
Unipolar measures of morality and acceptability
This measure of morality is a single item taken from Wheatley and Haidt (2005), 
measuring morality on a unipolar scale from Not at all morally wrong to Extremely morally 
wrong. Wheatley and Haidt used an unusual response method of a mark made on a continuous 
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line that was converted into a score from 1-100; in this study I used a 5-point scale similar to 
other unipolar measures in this study. This is a holistic assessment that does not break morality 
down into any potential parts, and does not incorporate any assessment of whether something 
is acceptable, even if it is permissible.
With the measure of morality, participants also responded to a variation modified to 
represent the question of permissibility raised by Schnall et al. (2008). While Schnall and 
colleagues seem to assume that acceptability is always predicated on permissibility, this 
approach should more clearly isolate the concept. It measures acceptability on a unipolar scale 
from Not at all okay to Perfectly okay.
Endorsement of Hostile Collective Action
Utilizing the approach of Zaal, Va Laar, Ståhl, and Ellemers (2011), participants answered
the following questions (from both subscales) in random order. The hostile forms subscale was 
averaged as the outcome of interest. Although Zaal and colleagues utilized an 9-point scale, to 
remain consistent with other measures in this study that use a bipolar scale, participants 
responded on a scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). Using the 9-point 
scale, Zaal and colleagues reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .92 for benevolent forms of collective 
action, a Cronbach’s alpha of .78 for hostile forms of collective action, and a correlation of 
moral conviction to support for hostile forms of collective action of .31, significant at the p<.001
level.
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Support for benevolent forms of collective action
‘I would be willing to support . . .
becoming a member of a collective action group that takes a stance against 
_________.
becoming a volunteer for a collective action group that takes a stance against 
_________.
taking part in a demonstration against _________.
serving as a fundraiser for a collective action group that takes a stance against 
_________.
Support for hostile forms of collective action1
‘I would be willing to support . . .
the organization of protests that actively block employees of organizations that 
promote _________ from reaching their workplace.2
the occupation of the buildings of organizations that promote _________.
throwing up barricades at organizations that promote _________, keeping their 
employees from going to work.
defacing the buildings of organizations that promote _________.
committing sabotage at organizations that _________.
Intolerance of Dissenting Others
Utilizing the approach of Cole Wright et al., (2008), participants were asked to imagine 
discovering that someone disagreed with them about each of the issues in three distinct 
1 These questions were modified with the addition of the word ‘promote’ as appropriate.
2 This question was modified by replacing ‘wild strikes’ with wording clearer and applicable to U.S. participants.
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contexts: a close friend or family member, someone they do not know well but see often (a 
classmate, colleague, or neighbor), and a stranger. This is a divergence from Cole Wright and 
colleagues’ approach as the original questions were worded for current university students (e.g.
a roommate). This wording as the benefit of distinguishing context by social risk (i.e. likelihood 
of future interaction with the target) and intimacy, as well as being the same contexts used in 
Studies 2 and 3 for measuring advocacy intentions. These ratings were made on a 7-point scale, 
from extremely/moderately/slightly unlikely, to slightly/moderately/extremely likely, with 
neither likely nor unlikely as a midpoint. Cole Wright and colleagues’ used this scale to report an
effect of moral classification (a binary category) on intolerance (in any context) at η2 = .76. The 
interaction of belief type and context was found to be η2 = .11.
Composite Regulatory Focus Scale
The Composite Regulatory Focus Scale (Haws, Dholakia, & Bearden, 2010) was 
developed in response to an analysis of existing chronic regulatory focus scales at the time. It 
measures promotion and prevention orientation across emotive, cognitive, outcome-oriented, 
and self-oriented frames. Out of 10 total items, 5 address promotion and 5 address prevention. 
The authors indirectly refer to using a Likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree, but 
do not specify the number of points in the scale. Based on several samples, they claimed a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .69 to .84 for the promotion focus questions and .67 to .77 for the 
prevention focus questions. In a test-retest scenario they measured a coefficient of stability 
of .67 for the promotion focus questions and .64 for the prevention focus questions. Haws and 
colleagues did not report any composite reliability calculations. 
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Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale
The short version Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale (Zakrisson, 2005) is a derivation of 
Altemeyer‘s (1998) longer scale, with specific changes that exclude items that refer to specific 
religions or ethnicities (as part of a block of questions that correlate too strongly with social 
dominance orientation), as well as some wording changes that make some items less extreme. 
This version is composed of 15 items. During testing of this short version, Cronbach’s alpha was 
measured at .72, while factor analysis revealed an imperfect but apparently acceptable fit (P = 
0.19; GFI = 0.93). Factor loadings were weakest for the conventialism factor, with a lowest 
loading of .27. It uses both positive and negatively-worded items. 
Big 5 Personality Measure
For the sake of testing convergent validity between Big 5 personality facets, face 
concerns, and social self-efficacy, participants will complete an 11-item Big 5 measure. This 
scale is a shortened version that has been shown to strongly correlate with longer, more widely 
used scales, while maintaining good test-retest reliability and predictive validity (Rammstedt & 
John, 2007). The scale may be used in a 10-question form, however, I included an optional 11th 
items recommended by the authors that may improve correlation of the agreeableness facet 
with other measures that have greater numbers of items. Rammstedt and John report a part-
whole correlation of the BFI-10 with the BFI-44 (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) at .83, with 
average test-retest stability of .75. The BFI-10 has much lower order dimension 
intercorrelations than typically found in Big 5 scales, with Rammstedt and John reporting an 
average intercorrelation of .11.
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Demographic Rescreen
Although participants were screened for United States Residency prior to beginning the 
survey, to check their response and collect additional demographics, participants answered 
questions regarding their gender, age, nationality, nation of residence, race, ethnicity, parents’ 
education level, own education level, and current student status.
Attention Check
In order to minimize the effects of inattention on data quality, I included an instructional
manipulation check, embedded in the rescreen form. Following a pattern given in Kees, Berry, 
Burton, and Sheehan (2017), participants were given the following instructions: “Research 
shows that people, when answering questions, prefer not to pay attention and minimize their 
effort as much as possible. If you are reading this question, please select ‘none of the above’ on 
the next question.” This was followed by the question “What was this study about?” to which 
participants may respond “Attitudes,” “Politics,” “Family relationships,” and “None of the 
above.” These answers should have been tempting to the inattentive participant, as they are all 
plausibly related to the study content.
Analysis
I conducted all analysis using R 3.5.3 (R Core Team, 2019). The measures included in this
study were planned to be treated in two ways: first, as individual correlates to the behavior of 
interest compared against each other, and second, as sources of questions upon which an 
exploratory factor analysis can be applied.
The first treatment was planned to be, in a way, the opposite of a meta-analytic review 
in which the goal is to smooth the effect of individual measures in order to reveal the 
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underlying effect strength. Instead, as these measures have different theoretical backgrounds 
and methodological justification, I wanted to explicitly compare their validity as predictors of 
so-called moral behavior. To do this, I planned to compare the correlation coefficients for 
significance. To achieve that, I intended to transform the coefficients using Fisher’s r-to-z 
(Fisher 1915, 1921), then use Steiger's (1980) Equations 3 and 10 to compute the asymptotic 
covariance of the estimates. I could then compare coefficients in an asymptotic z-test.
The second treatment would reconsider the relationship of these measures to each 
other not by highlighting their differences, but determining their similarities. Although each 
comes from a different theoretical or methodological approach, in an attempt to minimize 
jangle effects (Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2002; Kelley, 1927) we should consider whether 
some are more related than others. With exploratory analysis of the individual questions, I 
hoped to be able to suggest future approaches to improve measurement and reconcile 
disparate literature.
Power Analysis
According to the study plan, the first analysis would correlate each measure of moral 
conviction, the composite of strength contributors, and attitude bases to each outcome, 
controlling for attitude valence (positivity-negativity) and extremity (positivity+negativity). This 
would result in 11 partial correlations with each of the two Y variables in the following 
configurations3:
1. Cognitive basis → outcome
2. Affective basis → outcome
3 An asterisk (*) indicates questions that were reverse-coded.
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3. Strength contributors → outcome
4. Moral conviction (Skitka & Morgan, 2014) → outcome
5. Nonessentialist promotion (see Chapter 5, questions 1 and 3*) → outcome
6. Nonessentialist prevention (see Chapter 5, questions 2 and 4*) → outcome
7. Essentialist promotion (see Chapter 5, questions 5 and 7*) → outcome
8. Essentialist prevention (see Chapter 5, questions 6 and 8*) → outcome
9. Moral acceptability/permissibility (Schnall et al. 2008) → outcome
10. Unipolar moral judgment (Wheatley & Haidt 2005) → outcome
11. Unipolar acceptability judgment (modification of Wheatley & Haidt 2005) → outcome
Zaal, Van Laar, Ståhl, and Ellemers (2011) reported an effect size of moral conviction on 
hostile forms of collective action of R = .31, significant at the p<.001 level. They also report that 
an interaction of interest, prevention orientation x moral conviction, returned an effect size of B
= .30, R2 = .04, p = .004, with the effect significant for participants high in prevention focus at B 
= .73, p < .001. All measures were standardized.
Cole Wright et al.,  (2008) reported an effect of moral classification (a binary category) 
on intolerance at η2 = .76. Another interaction of interest, belief type and context, was found to 
be η2 = .11.
To determine significance of main effects, Zaal and Colleagues’ results suggest I may 
expect a medium effect size (Cohen, 2013).  Cole Wright and colleagues’ numbers seem 
unusually large, suggesting quite a large effect, but the interaction is more reasonable at, again,
a medium effect size. As eta-squared can be inflated in small effect sizes, I used a medium 
effect size in these calculations.
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I did not include the possible individual controls that were described in the measures 
section in this power analysis. As controlling for any variance should only better reveal unique 
variance in the correlation of interest, this approach is a conservative one to power analysis. 
However, to compare coefficients, I will have the possibility of 55 (11! / 2!(11-2)!) unique 
coefficient pairs. Although I will exclude any coefficients that are not significant (knowing this is 
in itself possibly a result of type 2 error), I will clearly significantly increase the chance of error 
by repeated testing of the same sample. Further, these tests will be conducted across three 
attitude topics, worsening the issue.
The results of this study are likely to be suggestive rather than conclusive (even 
precluding the caveats normally associated with well-framed research). However, it behooves 
me to make some adjustment for error. I intended to present raw results, in which no 
adjustments have been made to significance thresholds, and within which the degree of 
consistency in significance across attitude topics may be seen as a test of robustness to topic. 
Following this, I would re-perform identical correlation calculations and coefficient 
comparisons, save for generating the initial correlation in a bootstrapped procedure of 1000 
samples. It has been demonstrated that samples of 65, when subjected to 1000 replications, 
provide correlation estimates much closer to population estimates, reducing sample-specific 
idiosyncrasies (Sideridis & Simos, 2010). Finally, I will offer significance judgments of coefficient 
comparisons both at the accepted α = .05 level as well as a level adjusted via the Holm-
Bonferroni method (Holm, 1979).
Taking these assumptions, I anticipated single coefficients without additional controls at 
a medium effect size (.30). Using a β = .80 and α = 0.05, using G*Power 3.1.9.4 (Faul, Erdfelder, 
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Buchner, & Lang, 2009; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), I calculated that a single 
calculation will require a sample size of n = 84. Assuming a reduction of α to .01, I would require
n = 125, while a reduction of α to .001 would require n = 182.
Finally, the multiple measures of morality offer an opportunity to assess the questions 
and their theoretical backing via exploratory factor analysis. Garson (2008, as cited in Layes, 
Lalonde, Mecheri, & Rebaï, 2015) recommended a sample size of 10 per question in EFA, and 
with 15 questions this would result in a sample size of 150.
Considering the needs of both analyses, I collected 200 responses to achieve sufficient 
power for my purposes.
Results
Attention Check
Prior to analysis, I removed all responses that did not give the correct response to the 
attention check. Out of 250 total completed entries, 50 failed this check (the survey was 
reissued for more participants to take until the requisite number of participants passed this 
check). Paid online activities are likely to be of interest to makers of bots, and MTurk’s best 
practices include a time (generally within days) upon which all respondents will be paid if not 
rejected or accepted sooner by the task-giver through which inattentive or busy individuals may
cede the right to reject bad-faith responses, so one or more attention checks is best practice.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
To explore the relationships between and within morality measures, I initially conducted
an exploratory factor analysis. To begin, I separated the data out by attitude topic, with the 
intention of bringing it back together to see the analysis across topics.
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EFA for the issue of childhood immunizations
A parallel analysis suggested that the number of factors was 4.
Figure 7.2. Parallel analysis for all attitude measures for the issue of childhood immunizations.
EFA for the issue of abstinence-only sex education in public schools
A parallel analysis also suggested that the number of factors was 4.
Figure 7.3. Parallel analysis for all attitude measures for the issue of abstinence-only sex education in public 
schools.
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EFA for the death penalty
A parallel analysis also suggested that the number of factors was 4.
Figure 7.4. Parallel analysis for all attitude measures for the issue of the death penalty.
EFA across topics
Following the break out between topics, I collapsed across all three issues. While this
Figure 7.5. Parallel analysis for all attitude measures for all issues.
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does mean the data is not fully independent, this was done for the sake of simplicity and 
power. In this case, the parallel analysis suggested that 5 factors would be sufficient.
5-factor EFA  across Topics
Below are the results of the 5-factor structure across topics. The analysis used oblimin 
rotation with a minimum residual extraction method.
Table 7.2. Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix for 5-factor cross-topic EFA.
MR4 MR1 MR5 MR2 MR3
SS loadings 3.33 3.49 3.10 2.60 2.04
Proportion 
Var
0.12 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.08
Cumulative 
Var
0.12 0.25 0.37 0.46 0.54
Proportion 
Explained
0.23 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.14
Cumulative 
Proportion
0.23 0.47 0.68 0.86 1.00
With factor correlations of:
MR4 MR1 MR5 MR2 MR2
MR4 1.00 0.01 0.27 0.14 0.36
MR1 0.01 1.00 0.24 -0.41 0.06
MR5 0.27 0.24 1.00 0.11 -0.08
MR2 0.14 -0.41 0.11 1.00 -0.05
MR3 0.26 0.06 -0.08 -0.05 1.00
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Further details:
● The mean item complexity was  1.7. The test of the hypothesis indicated that 5 factors 
are sufficient.
● The degrees of freedom for the null model are 351 and the objective function was 14.17
with Chi Square of  8348.31. The degrees of freedom for the model are 226 and the 
objective function was 1.12.
● The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is  0.03.
● The df corrected root mean square of the residuals is  0.03.
● The harmonic number of observations is  599 with the empirical chi square  304.69  with
prob <  0.00037.
● The total number of observations was  600  with Likelihood Chi Square =  658.52  with 
prob <  7.1e-44.
● Tucker Lewis Index of factoring reliability =  0.916
● RMSEA index =  0.057  and the 90 % confidence intervals are  0.052, 0.062
● BIC =  -787.18
● Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.99
Table 7.3. Measures of factor score adequacy for 5-factor cross-topic EFA.
MR4 MR1 MR5 MR2 MR3
Correlation of 
(regression) scores with 
factors
0.96 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.91
Multiple R square of 
scores with factors 
0.92 0.92 0.87 0.84 0.82
Minimum correlation of 
possible factor scores
0.84 0.84 0.73 0.69 0.65
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Table 7.4. Factor loadings for 5-factor cross-topic EFA.
MR4 MR1 MR5 MR2 MR3
Valence 0.417
Ambivalence
Extremity 0.359
Affective Basis -0.326
Cognitive Basis
Certainty 0.786
Confidence 0.751
Importance 0.523
Relevance 0.463
Elaboration 0.477
Skitka1 0.849
Skitka2 0.703
Skitka3 0.914
Skitka4 0.867
Good to 
Support
0.780
Good to 
Oppose
-0.322 0.609
Bad to Support -0.460 0.504
Bad to Oppose 0.352 0.520
Good Person to
Support
0.349 0.646
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Table 7.4. Continued
MR4 MR1 MR5 MR2 MR3
Good Person to
Oppose
0.472
Bad Person to 
Support
0.412 0.511
Bad Person to 
Oppose
0.675
Acceptability / 
Permissibility
0.852
Supporting is 
Wrong
-0.550 0.396
Opposing is 
Wrong
0.700
Supporting is 
Okay
0.838
Opposing is 
Okay
-0.408 0.729
MR4 MR1 MR5 MR2 MR3
My interpretation of the factors above are thus:
Factor 1 (MR4) - Skitka's measure of moral conviction. Since this is the EFA, this result 
only supports these are coherent and distinct, not that they are predictive.
Factor 2 (MR1) - These questions definitely cross-load on valence and extremity, but it 
otherwise contains the non-prevention-oriented acceptability items and generic endorsement 
of supporting the issue. Since questions worded against the opposition track with extremity, 
non-extremity-caused moral judgments should be worded in the support direction and should 
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separate acceptability from permissibility. I might call this Attitude-Specific Approach 
Orientation -- endorsement for proactive but not prescribed attitude promotion.
Factor 3 (MR5) - Extremity. This also incorporates relevance (probably a precedent to 
extremity). There is heavy loading from essentialist moral judgments (bad person, good person)
and ones worded against the opposition (suggestive of prevention orientation). Hypothetically, 
it seems extremity may be influenced by perceived threat.
Factor 4 (MR2) - Valence. This has heavy cross-loading from the non-Skitka morality 
questions as they are valenced moral value judgments.
Factor 5 (MR3) - Cognitive attitude strength. All strength factors minus relevance, with 
negative loading from emotional basis. Ironically, cognitive basis itself does not load here; that 
was in fact due to failing to meet the 0.3 cutoff I used to clean up the table. Cognitive basis did 
load to some extent here, on extremity (see Factor 3, MR5), and on Skitka’s Moral Conviction 
(see Factor 1, MR4).
As a note, affective basis cross-loaded on every factor, and only barely loaded past the 
threshold on the attitude strength factor.
4-factor EFA  across topics
Although the parallel analysis across topics suggested a 5-factor structure, as the 
individual topics each suggested a 4-factor structure I also ran an EFA requested four factors be 
extracted. The analysis also used oblimin rotation with a minimum residual extraction method.
Table 7.5. Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix for 4-factor cross-topic EFA.
MR1 MR2 MR54 MR3
SS loadings 4.23 4.10 3.28 2.04
Proportion Var 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.08
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Table 7.5. Continued
MR1 MR2 MR54 MR3
Cumulative Var 0.16 0.31 0.43 0.51
Proportion 
Explained
0.31 0.30 0.24 0.15
Cumulative 
Proportion
0.31 0.61 0.85 1.00
With factor correlations of:
MR1 MR2 MR4 MR3
MR1 1.00 -0.16 0.20 0.01
MR2 -0.16 1.00 0.17 -0.12
MR4 0.20 0.17 1.00 0.37
MR3 0.01 -0.12 0.37 1.00
Further details:
● The mean item complexity was  1.5. The test of the hypothesis indicated that 4 factors 
are sufficient.
● The degrees of freedom for the null model are 351 and the objective function was 14.17
with Chi Square of  8348.31. The degrees of freedom for the model are 249 and the 
objective function was 1.78.
● The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is  0.04.
● The df corrected root mean square of the residuals is  0.05.
● The harmonic number of observations is  599 with the empirical chi square  625.88  with
prob <  2.3e-34.
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● The total number of observations was  600  with Likelihood Chi Square =  1044.11  with 
prob <  7.9e-98.
● Tucker Lewis Index of factoring reliability =  0.859
● RMSEA index =  0.074  and the 90 % confidence intervals are  0.068, 0.078
● BIC =  -548.73
● Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.98
Table 7.6. Measures of factor score adequacy for 4-factor cross-topic EFA.
MR4 MR1 MR5 MR2
Correlation of 
(regression) scores with 
factors
0.95 0.95 0.96 0.91
Multiple R square of 
scores with factors 
0.91 0.91 0.92 0.82
Minimum correlation of 
possible factor scores
0.82 0.82 0.84 0.65
Table 7.7. Factor loadings for 4-factor cross-topic EFA.
MR4 MR1 MR5 MR2
Valence 0.336
Ambivalence 0.349
Extremity 0.421
Affective Basis 0.392
Cognitive Basis
Certainty 0.793
Confidence 0.757
Importance 0.757
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Table 7.7. Continued
MR4 MR1 MR5 MR2
Relevance 0.412
Elaboration 0.477
Skitka1 0.846
Skitka2 0.698
Skitka3 0.911
Skitka4 0.863
Good to 
Support
0.679 -0.416
Good to 
Oppose
0.709
Bad to Support 0.812
Bad to Oppose 0.693
Good Person to
Support
0.820
Good Person to
Oppose
0.654
Bad Person to 
Support
0.753
Bad Person to 
Oppose
0.715
Acceptability / 
Permissibility
0.589 -0.454
Supporting is 
Wrong
0.790
Opposing is 
Wrong
0.656
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Table 7.7. Continued
MR4 MR1 MR5 MR2
Supporting is 
Okay
0.499 -0.469
Opposing is 
Okay
0.402
MR4 MR1 MR5 MR2
The fit statistics for the 4-factor model are slightly worse than those for the 5-factor 
model. Primarily, it appears that the four factors divide into a positive affect/high affect 
approach, other valence, moral conviction, and strength. It appears the four factor model 
conflates the attitude-specific approach orientation with extremity.
Regressions
I also ran regressions on the original morality measures with the intent of doing Fisher's 
r-to-z. However, since there was such persistent cross-loading of both cognitive and affective 
basis, and since Skitka and others have supposed that morality is a visceral, impulsive, or 
otherwise emotional factor, it seemed valuable to test for interactions on basis. (This led me to 
never test for significant difference between Z as interaction was so consistent.) These 
regressions were run across topics. Full regression details may be found in Appendix B, Tables 
B.1.1-B.1.8.
Moral conviction, which stood on its own in the factor analysis,  had a main effect on 
intolerance at all levels of social distance (p=.036-<0.01). Moral conviction also interacted with 
affective basis at close moderate (acquaintance; t(599)=1.07, p=0.04) social distance.
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Figure 7.6. Willingness to engage in hostile collective action by moral conviction by cognitive and affective basis. (In
this and all like charts, low and high levels were plotted at -1/+1 SD from the mean for that variable.)
Moral conviction also interacted with both affective and cognitive basis in predicting 
endorsement of hostile collective action (t(599)=1.41, p<0.01). In cases of low cognitive basis 
when affective basis is high, lower levels of moral conviction are associated with higher levels of
willingness toward hostile collective action, which drops under higher levels of moral 
conviction. However, when cognitive basis is also high, this drop in willingness reverses, and 
increased willingness to engage in hostile collective action appears (see figure 7.6; these figures 
were created using Dawson’s 3-way interaction plot method; Dawson 2020, Dawson 2014).
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Figure 7.7. Willingness to engage in hostile collective action by bipolar acceptability/permissibility by cognitive and 
affective bases.
A similar pattern of significance was found for the combined acceptability/permissibility 
scale; there was a significant three-way interaction with both bases in predicting hostile 
collection action (t(598)=1.49, p<0.01, figure 5.7) and intolerance of dissenting others at high 
social distance (t(593)=0.96, p=0.04, figure 5.8). However, when the model contained moral 
conviction, affective basis remained significant or continued to explain notable variance as a 
main effect, while cognitive basis did not. When acceptability/permissibility was used in the 
model,  both bases had a main effect or trended that direction for those outcomes that 
demonstrated significant effects. That moral conviction would appear to make cognitive basis 
less valuable without undermining the value of affective basis does not resonate with the claim 
that moral conviction is a more emotional than cognitive construct.
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Figure 7.8. Intolerance of dissenting others at high social distance (stranger) by bipolar acceptability/permissibility 
by cognitive and affective bases.
The promotion, essentialist, and non-essentialist frames, and the unipolar morality 
displayed or trended toward the same three-way interaction on endorsement of hostile 
collective action, but did not display any significant main effects nor interactions on intolerance 
measures.
The unipolar measure of moral okayness (acceptability) showed a potential trend 
toward a three-way interaction on endorsement of hostile collective action (t(599)=0.66, 
p=0.09). The potential effect seems similar to that found within the acceptability/permissibility 
scale, wherein when something is not seen as perfectly okay, high affective basis is associated 
with greater endorsement of hostile collective action hostile collective action, but when 
something is seem as perfectly okay/permissible, this effect dips when cognitive basis is low 
(Figure 7.9).
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Figure 7.9. Willingness to engage in hostile collective action by unipolar moral okayness by cognitive and affective 
bases.
This is a reversal of the interactive effect found between affective basis and moral 
conviction, in which high affective basis negated the relationship between moral conviction and
intolerance, strengthening the evidence and moral okayness interacts with cognitive basis, and 
moral conviction interacts with affective basis, in unique ways.
Conclusions for Morality Measures to be Used in Studies 2 and 3
For studies 2 and 3, I decided to use Skitka's measure and the support-worded unipolar 
measures of morality and acceptability. Exploratory factor analysis gave strong evidence that 
Skitka's measure is fundamentally different from the other measures, while the regressions 
offer evidence that it may vary from the others in the way it interacts with basis or the type of 
basis it may trend with. The acceptability measure had the highest loading on Factor 2, and I 
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think if you use acceptability it must be in conjunction with permissibility to separate the 
concepts for the participant.
Although I would not be measuring essentialist or promotion/prevention orientation 
morality using the questions I wrote for those concepts, this is because of the overlap with 
other concepts like extremity, emotionality, etc. I believed that it would be valuable to continue
with the following studies, in which I tested for contextual effects that align to these constructs 
(prevention/promotion via majority status threat and self/identity polarization via 
controversiality) in Study 2 and experimentally manipulate them in Study 3.
Other Discussion
Based on the interactions observed in the regression models, I believe that it would be 
valuable to continue to explore the relationships between moral conviction and moral 
acceptability with attitude basis. Moral conviction more consistently interacted with affective 
than cognitive basis, although each appears to contribute its own unique effect capable of 
interaction. That high moral conviction may have the greatest effect at high levels of affective 
basis may explain previous assertions that morality is associated with visceral, affective 
response (and generally avoidant behavior -- the positive relationship between high affective 
basis and tolerance I believe is better explained by people with high need for affect valuing 
close interpersonal relationships more). However, I also found that when cognitive basis is high,
morality may have inverse effects, engendering greater approach behavior. 
The finding that at high levels of cognitive basis, okayness predicts less endorsement of 
collective action at high levels of okayness and no greater endorsement at low levels of 
okayness, is interesting, as it would suggest cognitive basis in the frame of moral beliefs of 
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principle increases approach, while in the frame of social and moral acceptability does not. I 
believe this suggestion merits further study.
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CHAPTER 8.    STUDY 2
Study Goals
As Study 1 clarified the construct of morality in attitudes, Study 2 addressed my core 
question of that potential relationship between morality and advocacy. Advocacy is a specific 
subset of behavior with specific goals, with a high degree of social risk. More importantly, any 
given person likely picks and chooses between multiple attitudes, some of which they advocacy 
for and some of which they don’t. Thus, I believed it holds that there should be some 
relationship between metafactors of an attitude (content, strength, and/or morality) and the 
intent to engage in advocacy on behalf of it. Further, as a risky social act, I hypothesized that 
effects will be strongest for attitudes with high perceived controversy, as the generalized threat
to one’s stance is more salient and will generate more defensive advocating. Finally, consistent 
with the phenomenon of moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990), I believed that perception that one’s 
attitude is held by the majority of other people will lead to increased advocacy, as majority 
status increases social safety, may increase the perceived benefit of virtue signaling, and may 
lead the attitude holder to see those who disagree as less deserving of moral behavior, i.e. 
politeness. I intended to test these metafactors to determine which factors have the strongest 
relationship to advocacy intentions.
Design
This study, as in Study 1, used a cross-sectional design that intended to capitalize on 
naturally existing variance in multiple attitude topics. In this study I utilized those measure(s) of 
moral conviction that were found more predictive or scientifically valuable in Study 1 (namely,  
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moral conviction and a unipolar measure of acceptability) in conjunction with measures of 
perceived controversy of the topic, and the perception of one’s attitude as in the minority or 
majority. These three variables were used in conjunction to test for effects on:
1. Self-reported spontaneous (unrequested) advocacy intentions, and
2. A behavioral measure of advocacy.
As possible controls for future work, I also measured attitude valence, attitude bases, 
attitude strength contributors, trait face concerns, right wing authoritarianism, social self-
efficacy, and Big 5 personality variables.
Participants
As in Study 1, participants were recruited online via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
where they were given monetary compensation for participation. Participants were required to 
be age 18 or older and be current residents of the United States. Participants were also barred 
from participation in this study if they had completed another study in this series (Study 1 and/
or 3). See Section 2.1.4 for a discussion of the validity of an MTurk subject pool.
This study followed the same guidelines for maximizing data quality as those described 
in Study 1, namely, questions requiring subjectively truthful answer content, and a check of 
attention embedded in the measures.
In total I collected responses from 300 participants after exclusions (see Attention 
Check). 128 participants self-reported as female, 172 as male. Self-reported age ranged from 
19-72, with a mean of 35.45. 201 self-reported their race as white, 67 as black, 19 as Asian, 1 
Indian American or Alaskan Native, 8 as multiracial, and 4 as other. 57 participants described 
their ethnicity as latino/a. Regarding highest attained level of education, 85 participants had 
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completed no more than high school, 156 had completed an Associate’s or Bachelor’s degree, 
and 57 reported post-baccalaureate academic or professional degrees. 67 participants said they
were currently a student.
Procedures
Firstly, procedures regarding consent, attitude valence, bases, strength contributors, 
and morality were as in Study 1, excepting the reduction of morality measures based on Study 1
results and a change in attitude topics to “genetically modified foods”, “laws preventing 
discrimination based on sexual orientation”, and “policies intended to reverse human-caused 
climate change”. Second, participants answered questions about their intentions to advocate in
various contexts. Third, participants were informed that, as these issues are highly relevant to 
today’s current events, I wanted to publish some comments in more detail about people’s 
rationale for their attitude on this topic (for each topic one at a time, according to 
counterbalancing procedures laid out for Study 1). They were told that not answering this 
question would not count against them for getting credit for participation, but if they were 
willing to explain their position  they were asked to do so in a text essay box. Fourth, 
participants were presented with a measure of normativity that captured both their perception 
of the issue as controversial (a ratio of individuals with attitudes on either of the farthest ends 
of the scale) and their perception of themselves as being in the majority (the number of 
individuals who fall on their side or in the middle of the scale). Fifth, participants completed 
several questionnaires measuring individual differences in trait face concerns, social self-
efficacy, right wing authoritarianism, and Big 5 personality dimensions. Finally, participants 
completed a demographics questionnaire and debrief as in Study 1. Participation was expected 
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to take approximately 20 minutes. Participants were paid $1 for the task. No participants 
requested partial compensation.
Figure 8.1. Order of measures within Study 2, moving down each column before proceeding to the next node.
Figure 8.2. Order of measures within Study 2 continued, moving down each column before proceeding to the next 
node.
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Measures
Firstly, measures of attitude valence, bases, strength contributors, and morality were as 
in Study 1, excepting the reduction of morality measures based on Study 1 results. The Big 5 
personality measure was also as in Study 1. Measures specific to this study are listed below.
Advocacy Intentions
The measure of advocacy is taken from Cheatham and Tormala (2015), but specified 
spontaneous advocacy, based on a method used by Teeny and Petty (2018). The questions were
worded to capture both sharing intentions and persuasion intentions across a range of 
audiences (close relationships, acquaintances, and strangers). This results in a 3 (audience) x 2 
(sharing vs. persuasion) test of 6 statements. Cheatham and Tormala created composite indices
by intention and context and reported alphas greater than .86.
Behavioral Measure of Advocacy
For this measure, participants read the following prompt:
You know that this is an academic study of attitudes. As these issues are highly relevant 
to today’s current events, we would like to publish some comments in more detail about 
people’s rationale for their attitude on this topic. Not answering this question will not 
count against you for getting credit for participation. If you are willing, please explain 
your position regarding ________ in the text box below. Your answer will remain 
anonymous.
This measure was operationalized as a continuous measure of advocacy by response 
length.
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Attitude Normativity
Participants were asked about their perceived normativity of each of the 8 original 
attitudes through estimated frequency. For each attitude, participants were asked “What 
percentage of people in the United States do you believe have the following attitude toward 
__________?” They responded by typing numbers next to the following labels: Extremely 
favorable Somewhat favorable, Somewhat unfavorable, Extremely unfavorable, Mixed feelings, 
and Indifferent. The numbers were required to add up to 100. It has been shown that 
normativity interacts with one’s motivation to comply with social norms (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1973). In this case, face concerns may be seen as a measurement for that motivation to comply.
Face Concerns
Participants completed a 21-statement face concerns measure (Zane, 2000). This is a 
trait scale that asks about general tendencies toward behavior that preserves one’s own face as
well as others’ face. Participants rated their agreement on a 7-point scale of Strongly disagree, 
Moderately agree, Mildly agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Mildly agree, Moderately agree, 
and Strongly agree. Zane reports internal consistency of the scale with an alpha of .83.
Social Self-efficacy
To measure the degree to which participants may be confident in their ability to manage
face, they completed the 8-question New General Self-Efficacy Scale (Chen, Gully, & Eden, 
2001). The scale instructions were modified to focus the self-ratings of efficacy on social efficacy
in the following way: “Use the scale below to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree
with each statement as it applies to you when trying to achieve goals in a social context  . ” 
Participants rated agreement on a 7-point scale of Strongly disagree, Disagree, Somewhat 
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disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree, and Strongly agree. Chen and 
colleagues reported alphas for the NGSE items between .85 and .88.
Analysis
I conducted all analysis using R 3.5.3 (R Core Team, 2019). Using ordinary least squares 
regression, I planned to regress sharing intentions, persuasive intentions, and the behavioral 
measure of advocacy on morality, perception of the topic as controversial, and perception of 
their attitude as being in the majority (see Figure 8.3). I controlled for valence, basis, and 
strength contributors.
Figure 8.3. Study 2 test model, with multiple Y variable boxes representing separate analyses.
Power Analysis
In this study, I am assessing main effects and possible 2- or 3-way interactions between 
three variables on two outcomes.
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Assuming a small effect (α = .10), to find a single main effect with p = .05 and β = .80, I 
would need a sample size of 782. Assuming a medium effect (α = .30), I would need a sample 
size of 84.
If I intend to find a three-way interaction with a medium effect size (f2 = .15), under the 
same assumptions of error and power I would need a sample size of 77. The same three-way 
interaction with a small effect size (f2 = .02) would require a sample size of 550.
Although there is evidence (see Study 1) for medium effects in morality and attitude-
driven behavior, it would be overly liberal to assume medium effects in all variables. In order to 
generate a data set of reasonable proportions, I collected 300 responses. All analyses were 
conducted in G*Power 3.1.9.4 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007) and assume two-tailed analysis.
Hypotheses
I predicted that moral conviction will significantly predict advocacy intentions and 
observed (behavioral) advocacy. Further, I believed this effect would be stronger when 
controversiality is high (as a greater moral conviction is needed to overcome the social risk in 
discussing a controversial topic), as well as when one perceived one’s attitude as being in the 
majority, according to the theory of moral exclusion. I believed there was potential to find a 
three-way interaction, in which moral conviction best predicted advocacy when the attitude is 
seen as controversial, but one believes one’s attitude is in the majority, as the disagreeing other
presents a greater threat to be subdued to maintain the dominance of the majority group.
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Results
Attention Check
As in Study 1, prior to analysis, I removed all responses that did not give the correct 
response to the attention check. Out of 374 total completed entries, 74 failed this check (the 
survey was reissued for more participants to take until the requisite number of participants 
passed this check). On a cursory inspection, while no clear patterns of repeated answering 
emerged (e.g. responding with 4 repeatedly on every 7-point scale), many respondents had 
nonsensical fragment answers to the open-ended questions. This may have been due to the 
presence of bots who still managed to pass the attention check. However, some participants 
may also become concerned, even when assured to the contrary, that a non-response will be 
counted against them, and may have submitted placeholder text with no bad faith intended. 
Due to this possibility, data from these participants was retained, although the non-answers 
were dealt with as will be explained below (see Behavioral Measure of Advocacy).
Conceptual Replication of Study 1
Before performing the procedure of interest, I felt it useful to validate the results of 
Study 1 by examining potential interactions of basis and morality measure. The advocacy 
outcomes were each regressed on cognitive basis, emotional basis, strength, moral conviction 
or okayness (one at a time), and interactions of basis and the morality measure. When testing 
okayness, valence was included as a control due to the directionality of the statement. This 
conceptual replication collapsed across all levels of social distance.
Summary results indicate that, when utilizing the measure of moral conviction, neither 
cognitive nor affective basis had a consistent main effect on any of the behaviors, each only 
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significant or suggesting that direction for proactive sharing, and varying in whether they 
reached or trended that direction depending on the issue at hand. More interesting was a 
significant interaction between moral conviction and cognitive basis in predicting proactive 
sharing (t(299)=2.82, p<0.01) and proactive persuasion (t(299)=2.03, p=0.04) for the issue of 
GMOs, while affective basis, cognitive basis, and moral conviction demonstrated a three-way 
interaction in predicting proactive sharing (t(299)=-2.51, p=0.01) for the issue of laws 
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation. For this issue, proactive persuasion 
showed the same trend without crossing the preset alpha level (t(299)=-1.91, p=0.06). Finally,
Figure 8.4. Proactive sharing by moral conviction for low cognitive basis responses at levels of affective basis for 
the topic of GMOs.
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the same three-way interaction was observed in predicting proactive sharing for the issue of 
climate change (t(299)=-2.49, p=0.01), with no suggestive trend for proactive persuasion. The 
complete summary of results may be found in Appendix B.2.
When testing the nature of this three way interaction, I plotted the interaction of basis 
for those observations at one standard deviation below the mean (low), at the mean (average), 
and one standard deviation above the mean (high). As a baseline, the non-significant results on 
the subject of GMOs appear in figure 8.4.
Figure 8.5. Proactive sharing by moral conviction for low cognitive basis responses at levels of affective basis for 
the topic of discrimination.
For the issue of discrimination, we can see that in general, higher affective basis and 
higher moral conviction may predict some increase in proactive sharing, with the effect of 
moral conviction appearing stronger at higher levels of affective basis (Figure 8.5). However, 
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this trend only appears when cognitive basis is low; when cognitive basis is high, lower levels of 
moral conviction show the highest amount of intended proactive sharing. This suggests that 
when cognitive basis is high, with high affective basis, individuals who see an issue as containing
less moral conviction may be sharing their opinion as a method of exploring their numerous or 
highly salient thoughts on the subject, while high moral conviction suppresses sharing through 
decreased perceived utility.
Figure 8.6. Proactive sharing by moral conviction for low cognitive basis responses at levels of affective basis for 
the topic of climate change.
The pattern of high cognitive basis, high affective basis, and low moral conviction 
resulting in higher levels of proactive sharing repeats for the issue of climate change (Figures 
8.6). Given that for GMOs there were very few individuals with average affective basis at high 
levels of cognitive basis, this may explain the lack of significance found on that topic.
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As there was also a trending three way interaction in proactive persuasion for the topic 
of discrimination, I performed the same basic breakdown. The patterns at high levels of 
cognitive basis are extremely similar. While the three way interaction did not reach the level of 
significance for proactive persuasion on any topic, and neared it in the case of discrimination 
(t(299)=-1.91, p=0.06), the overall trends are very like (Figures 8.7-8.9). 
Figure 8.7. Proactive persuasion by moral conviction for responses at levels of cognitive and affective basis for the 
topic of GMOs.
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Figure 8.8. Proactive persuasion by moral conviction for responses at levels of cognitive and affective basis for the 
topic of discrimination.
Figure 8.9. Proactive persuasion by moral conviction for responses at levels of cognitive and affective basis for the 
topic of climate change.
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Regarding the measure of moral okayness, there was some possible trending in the case
of proactive sharing, but, unlike moral conviction, only significant or near-significant 
interactions in the case of reactive behavior. On the topic of GMOs, every coefficient was 
significant, including the three-way interaction of okayness, cognitive basis, and affective basis 
(t(299)=2.12, p=0.04). Reactive behavior continued to show potential basis effects as reactive 
persuasion on the topic of GMOs demonstrated a main effect of cognitive basis (t(299)=2.86, 
p<0.01), affective basis (t(299)=1.98, p=0.05), and okayness (t(299)=2.11), p=0.04). While no 
interactions were significant, the three way interaction trend appears promising (t(299)=1.82, 
p=0.07). A potential trend was seen in reactive persuasion on the topic of discrimination, while 
a possible trend in proactive sharing might be seen on the topic of climate change. The 
inconsistency of these results raises questions, although the strength of the effect on reactive 
sharing for GMOs is interesting. Full regression results may be seen in Appendix B.2.
When plotting the three way interaction on reactive sharing on the topic of GMOs, 
linear direction appeared inconsistent with previous findings when graphed (Figures 8.10). 
However, density plots suggest that the meaningful interaction is likely the increasing 
consistency of behavior at greater levels of cognitive basis (Figures 8.11-8.13). On the topic of 
GMOs, for those with low affective basis, at increasing levels of cognitive basis and moral 
conviction, respondents much more consistently report willingness to share their attitude when
asked. In general, while okayness and cognitive basis both appear to positively, if slightly, 
increase or increase consistency in willingness to share, affective basis may slightly suppress 
this effect.
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Figure 8.10. Reactive sharing by moral okayness for responses at levels of cognitive and affective basis for the topic
of GMOs.
Figure 8.11. Scatterplot with 2D density projection of reactive sharing by moral okayness for low cognitive basis 
responses at low, avg., and high levels of affective basis for the topic of GMOs.
85
Figure 8.12.  Scatterplot with 2D density projection of reactive sharing by moral okayness for average cognitive 
basis responses at low, avg., and high levels of affective basis for the topic of GMOs.
Figure 8.13. Scatterplot with 2D density projection of reactive sharing by moral okayness for high cognitive basis 
responses at low, avg., and high levels of affective basis for the topic of GMOs.
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Figure 8.14. Proactive sharing by moral okayness for responses at levels of cognitive and affective basis for the 
topic of climate change.
I was unable to look at the comparable patterns of density in discrimination as the 
density estimate requires a greater degree of variance betwen quantiles -- for low cognitive 
basis, the only observations at a low affective basis were at maximum okayness. On the topic of
climate change, a similar restriction is seen (e.g. all participants who reported both high 
cognitive basis and high affective basis reported maximum okayness). The distributions in this 
variable may have affected the model’s ability to test the interaction.
Finally, the suggestive nature of the results in which the outcome was proactive sharing 
for the topic of climate change begs a similar examination. These results (see Figure 8.14) 
suggest a similar pattern in proactive sharing for okayness as was found in proactive sharing for 
moral conviction. The steep line in which lower okayness is associated with greater proactive 
sharing for those with high cognitive basis and moderate affective basis mirrors the previous 
results. However, the restriction here as well precludes examination via density, and likely 
diminishes power to find an effect if a true effect exists.
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In sum, it appears that basis may be a factor in the relationship of morality and advocacy
behavior, as suggested by the results of study 1. In particular, basis appears to influence the 
relationship in proactive behavior when studied in the context of moral conviction, and to 
sharing behavior in the context of moral okayness.
Advocacy as Predicted by Moral Conviction, Perceived Majority Status of the Respondent’s 
Attitude, and Perceived Controversiality
To test the primary hypotheses of this study, the advocacy outcomes were each 
regressed on strength, moral conviction or okayness (one at a time), perception of one’s 
attitude as being in the majority or not, perception of the topic’s controversiality, and 
interactions of the lattermost three. When testing okayness, valence was included as a control 
due to the directionality of the statement. This analysis collapsed across all levels of social 
distance. As basis was not included in the hypotheses of this study, it was not accounted for in 
these models.
In analyses using the moral conviction measure, significant effects were observed in 
both reactive behaviors (a two-way interaction of majority and moral conviction on reactive 
sharing (t(299)=-2.30, p=0.02; figure 8.15), a two-way interaction of controversiality and moral 
conviction on the same (t(299)=2.56, p=0.01; figure 8.16), and a two way interaction of majority
and moral conviction on reactive persuasion (t(299)=2.31, p=0.02; figure 8.17)) on the issue of 
GMOs. Although trends suggest continued potential for a three-way interaction (three-way 
interaction on reactive sharing (t(299)=-1.57, p=.12); on proactive sharing (t(299)=-1.90, 
p=0.06), this is not supported by this analysis, was not formally hypothesized, and if extant in 
fact may require more power to detect. In tests utilizing the discrimination topic measures, a 
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two way interaction was detected of majority and controversiality on proactive persuasion 
(t(299)=-2.04, p=0.04; figure 8.18), but there was no significant interactions on other outcomes.
In tests utilizing the climate change topic measures, only a main effect of moral conviction was 
found on proactive sharing (t(299)=3.86, p<0.01), reactive persuasion (t(299)=2.12, p=0.03), 
and proactive persuasion (t(299)=4.04, p<0.01). Attitude strength was consistently predictive 
across almost all analyses, excepting proactive behavior on the climate change topic after 
accounting for moral conviction.
Figure 8.15. Reactive sharing by moral conviction for observers who see themselves as holding the minority or 
majority opinion for the topic of GMOs.
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Figure 8.16. Reactive sharing by moral conviction by perceived controversiality for the topic of GMOs.
Figure 8.17. Reactive persuasion by moral conviction for observers who see themselves as holding the minority or 
majority opinion for the topic of GMOs.
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Figure 8.18. Proactive persuasion by controversiality for observers who see themselves as holding the minority or 
majority opinion for the topic of discrimination.
These results suggest that the positive relationship between advocacy and moral 
conviction is stronger when one sees oneself as holding the majority opinion, in line with my 
hypothesis. Majority also appears to be able to overcome the suppressive effect of 
controversiality in some cases. Also in line with what was hypothesized, the relationship of 
moral conviction to advocacy, when an effect is found, is strongest when controversiality is 
high. At low levels of perceived controversiality, individuals may express more sharing behavior 
at low levels of moral conviction, perhaps as a way of exploring the topic when there is 
sufficient indicators that others will have varying opinions to hear, while without the risk of 
broaching a highly controversial topic. However, when moral conviction is high, sharing 
behavior drops, unless there is sufficient moral conviction to overcome the suppression.
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In analyses using the moral okayness measure, after accounting for valence, okayness 
showed a significant main effect on reactive sharing (t(299)=3.50, p<0.01), proactive sharing 
(t(299)=2.52, p=0.01), and proactive persuasion (t(299)=2.61, p<0.01) for the GMOs topic. The 
only interaction detected was majority and controversiality, as in the moral conviction analyses,
interacting to predict proactive persuasion for the discrimination topic (t(299)=-2.20, p=0.03; 
Figure 8.25 represents this relationship in this circumstance as well, as the figure utilizes the 
raw relationships and is not adjusted based on residuals from the morality measure used in 
regression).
Behavioral Measure of Advocacy
As mentioned in the section Attention Check, many respondents to the open-ended 
questions had nonsensical fragment answers. As some participants may have become 
concerned, even when assured to the contrary, that a non-response will be counted against 
them, they may have submitted placeholder text with no bad faith intended. Thus, data from 
these participants was retained, although the non-answers were coded out.
I coded all open-ended responses as answers or non-answers. Responses that were 
nothing but declinations to answer, apparent summaries of web pages from search engine 
results on the topic, identifiable by the use of nothing but sentence fragments and ellipses (e.g. 
“When asked which of three positions best fits their viewpoints, about half of ... A majority of 
this group also believe GM foods are very likely to bring ... foods; 29% have heard “a lot,” 
roughly half (52%) have heard “a little. ... About half of the public (48%) says they do not eat 
GM foods or do so not too much”), and answers that were not related to content nor rationale 
but appeared as patent copy-pastes of the top google definition of the topic (e.g. “Genetically 
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modified crops are publicly the most controversial GMOs. The majority [of GMOs] are 
engineered for herbicide tolerance or insect resistance.”) were coded as non-answers. In the 
case of these copy-paste answers, I believe they were not likely indirect summaries of the 
respondent’s own attitude either because they truly were definitions alone with no value 
judgments, utility beliefs, or any other attitude-related content, but the same summaries were 
given by many different respondents, reflecting their search engine priority.
Non-answers were then all given scores of zero as all answers were subjected to a count
of characters. This is a rough measure of degree of advocacy, better than simple booleans but 
still not reflective necessarily of attitude depth, complexity, or intent to influence others.
In this measure, unlike the generic intent to advocate measures, responses were split by
actual topic. Due to this, the topic-specific predictors were matched to an actual advocacy 
behavior specific to the topic by which those predictors were framed.
For all topics, moral conviction significantly predicted observable advocacy behavior in 
the length of open-ended responses (GMOs: t(299)=-2.58, p=0.01; discrimination: t(299)=2.02, 
p=0.044; climate change: t(299)=-2.75, p<0.01). Majority status, controversiality, and moral 
conviction demonstrated a significant three way interaction on the topic of climate change 
(t(299)=-1.96, p=0.05), a topic potentially more salient than the others as these data were 
collected in October 2019, one month following the climate activist Greta Thunberg’s speech on
climate before the UN.
This pattern repeated for the measure of okayness (main effect of okayness on GMOs: 
t(299)=-2.76, p<0.01; discrimination: t(299)=1.94, p=0.05; climate change: t(299)=-2.86, 
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p=0.01), although the three way interaction fell short of the level of significance (t(299)=-1.92, 
p=0.06).
Although 113 respondents reported an attitude and a believed frequency of that 
attitude that would put them in the majority, and 187 would fall in the minority (all others 
would have reported indifferent or equally positive and negative aspects to their attitude, i.e. 
ambivalence), no one who felt they were in the majority saw the issue of climate change as of 
low controversiality. The point of possible interaction that stands out, and appears for both 
moral conviction and for the okayness measure, is a positive or significantly stronger positive 
relationship of moral conviction to length of open-ended response when controversiality is 
average and one is in the majority. The effect of moral conviction on length of open-ended 
responses is flat or close to flat when controversiality is high. It appears that situations of 
moderate risk or perceived extremity of opinion elicit the most advocacy, as the topic maintains
sufficient interest without excessive suppression.
Figure 8.19. Length of open ended responses by moral conviction at low levels of controversiality for observers 
who see themselves as holding the minority or majority opinion for the topic of climate change.
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Figure 8.20. Length of open ended responses by moral conviction at average levels of controversiality for observers
who see themselves as holding the minority or majority opinion for the topic of climate change.
Figure 8.21. Length of open ended responses by moral conviction at high levels of controversiality for observers 
who see themselves as holding the minority or majority opinion for the topic of climate change.
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Figure 8.22. Length of open ended responses by moral okayness at low levels of controversiality for observers who 
see themselves as holding the minority or majority opinion for the topic of climate change.
Figure 8.23. Length of open ended responses by moral okayness at average levels of controversiality for observers 
who see themselves as holding the minority or majority opinion for the topic of climate change.
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Figure 8.24. Length of open ended responses by moral okayness at high levels of controversiality for observers who
see themselves as holding the minority or majority opinion for the topic of climate change.
Is it interesting to note that, unlike all previous analyses, for no topic did attitude 
strength significantly predict observed advocacy behavior.
Discussion
Results from the conceptual replication of study 1 continue to suggest that basis may 
interact in meaningful ways with the morality of a given attitude. In particular, it merits further 
investigation into whether moral conviction and affect combine to shut down proactive 
advocacy that would otherwise occur. If attitudes become seen as extremely moral with 
attendant strong affect, attitudes otherwise high in cognitive basis may go undiscussed and pre-
existing beliefs may become more entrenched over time. Further, when the morality of a topic 
varies by the degree to which is is or isn’t acceptable/okay rather than its abstract connection 
to values, the dip in advocacy at the highest levels of morality was not found on sharing 
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behavior (perhaps due to the positive frame eliminating the harshest of threat sensitivity from 
the question). In general, range restrictions (either an insufficient number of maximally morally 
convicted individuals, or an excess of them) may have undermined power in evaluating the 
effects of basis and morality in the desired variant combinations.
Regarding my initial hypotheses, both primary hypotheses were supported by some 
evidence. The positive relationship between morality and advocacy appeared stronger when 
one sees oneself as holding the majority opinion. The same effect was also strongest when 
controversiality is high -- that is, if moral conviction is low, controversiality appears to suppress 
sharing behavior, but when moral conviction is high, this suppressive effect disappears.
The behavioral measure of advocacy did not show as many suggestive indicators of 
interaction, other than between moderate levels of controversiality and the belief that one’s 
attitude is in the majority. However, in this measure, morality had a much more robust main 
effect, which I believe is due to the topic-focused nature of this outcome. Studies that use the 
abstraction of general intent to advocate from intent rather advocate on behalf of a specific 
topic are likely undermining their ability to detect real effects.
This study on the whole gives clear evidence of several weaknesses in modern social 
psychology and specifically attitude research: 1) the choice of attitude is not neutral in its 
influence on the process, nor do typical controls sufficiently account for the affecting attitude-
specific qualities; 2) the fragility of effects between topics, outcomes, frames, etc., by most 
researchers, would have led to file-drawering half or more of these results, leading to a general 
overestimation of effect and likely waste of valuable scientific time for future researchers who 
may experience type 2 error; and 3) the frequency at which evidence appears for interactions 
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between variables, and our inability to run studies of sufficient power to handle four, five, or six
way interactions, is giving us a much shallower picture of the effects of attitude structure and 
content on behavior. While we may be able to isolate one specific effect of one measure on 
another, even better if we do so in the context of a third, extrapolating meaning from that, 
applicable to the real world, is unlikely. While it is the nature of science to test small effects in 
small pieces, the complexity of human subjects research continues to suggest that we should be
moving away from singular tests with singular stimuli and simple interactions. As that form of 
research would not wed well with hypothesis testing at arbitrary levels of statistical 
significance, we continue to be ripe for a renaissance of other methods of determining scientific
truth.
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CHAPTER 9. STUDY 3
Study Goals
Following the cross-sectional examination of Study 2, in this study I intended to 
experimentally manipulate some of the apparent underlying processes, namely the perception 
that one’s attitudes are strong expressions of one’s true self, and the salience of promotion or 
prevention regulatory foci.
Design
This study used a 2x2 between-subjects design that experimentally manipulated attitude
essentialism and regulatory focus. Participants responded as in Studies 1 and 2 to measures of 
attitude valence, bases, strength contributors, and morality, for the attitude object “additional 
gun control legislation”. They then experienced counterbalanced manipulations of the 
experimental variables, responded to measures of self-reported advocacy intentions, and were 
given a behavioral measure of advocacy, as in Study 2.
As possible controls, I also measured attitude valence, attitude bases, attitude strength 
contributors, trait face concerns, right wing authoritarianism, social self-efficacy, and Big 5 
personality dimensions.
Participants
As in Studies 1 and 2, participants were recruited online via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) where they were given monetary compensation for participation. Participants were 
required to be age 18 or older and be current residents of the United States. Participants were 
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also barred from participation in this study if they had completed another study in this series 
(Study 1 and/or 2). See Section 2.1.4 for a discussion of the validity of an MTurk subject pool.
This study followed the same guidelines for maximizing data quality as those described 
in Study 1, namely, questions requiring subjectively truthful answer content, and a check of 
attention embedded in the measures.
In total I collected responses from 419 participants after exclusions (see Attention 
Check). 192 participants self-reported as female, 227 as male. Self-reported age ranged from 
19-80, with a mean of 38.65. 321 self-reported their race as white, 50 as black, 28 as Asian, 6 
Indian American or Alaskan Native, 7 as multiracial, and 7 as other. 54 participants described 
their ethnicity as latino/a. Regarding highest attained level of education, 153 participants had 
completed no more than high school, 182 had completed an Associate’s or Bachelor’s degree, 
and 82 reported post-baccalaureate academic or professional degrees. 59 participants said they
were currently a student.
Procedures
Firstly, procedures regarding consent, attitude valence, bases, strength contributors, 
and morality were as in Study 2; however, the attitude topic in this experiment was only 
“additional gun control legislation”, resulting in only a single block of attitude-related measures.
Second, participants were exposed to one of four combinations of experimental manipulations, 
counterbalanced in order of manipulation presentation. Third, they answered questions about 
their intentions to advocate in various contexts, as well as given the opportunity to engage in
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Figure 9.1. Order of measures within Study 3, moving down each column before proceeding to the next node.
Figure 9.2. Order of measures within Study 3 continued, moving down each column before proceeding to the next 
node.
directly observable (behavioral) advocacy, as in Study 2. The rest of the study also proceeded as
in Study 2, covering measures of attitude normativity, trait face concerns, social self-efficacy, 
right wing authoritarianism, and Big 5 personality dimensions, followed by a demographics 
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questionnaire and debrief. Participation was expected to take approximately 30 minutes. 
Participants were paid $1.50 for the task.  No participants requested partial compensation.
Materials
All measures are as in Study 2, with the exception of the experimental manipulation. 
Each participant received two manipulations, one of each variable, in random order.
Attitude Essentialism
Essential attitude manipulation
It is widely understood that attitudes are very reflective of who you are as a 
person. They communicate to others what you value, they affect your behavior, and they
shape your future. Please take a moment to think about some of the attitudes you hold 
that are most closely related to who you are. Describe some of these attitudes in the box 
below.
We ask that you take at least two minutes to think about these attitudes. This 
page of the survey will allow you to continue when two minutes have passed.
Nonessential attitude manipulation
It is widely understood that the attitudes you hold today may not be reflective of 
who you are as a person. Attitudes change throughout the lifetime, and what you believe
today may be very different from who you really are, or what you will believe in the 
future. Please take a moment to think about some of the attitudes you hold that were 
significantly different at one time. Describe some of these attitudes in the box below.
We ask that you take at least two minutes to think about these attitudes. This 
page of the survey will allow you to continue when two minutes have passed.
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Regulatory Focus
The wording of ideal and ought selves in these prompts is derived from the regulatory 
focus manipulation method described by Higgins, Shah, and Friedman (1997).
Prevention orientation manipulation
In this study, we are interested in how you picture the person you believe you 
should be. What is the type of person you believe it is your duty, obligation, or 
responsibility to be? Please take a moment to think about this person. Describe them in 
the box below.
We ask that you take at least two minutes to think about this concept. This page 
of the survey will allow you to continue when two minutes have passed.
Promotion orientation manipulation
In this study, we are interested in how you picture the person you ideally would 
like to be. What is the type of person you hope, wish, or aspire to be? Please take a 
moment to think about this person. Describe them in the box below.
We ask that you take at least two minutes to think about this concept. This page 
of the survey will allow you to continue when two minutes have passed.
Analysis
I conducted all analysis using R 3.5.3 (R Core Team, 2019). Using a linear regression with 
dummy variables to represent condition, I regressed sharing intentions, persuasive intentions, 
and the behavioral measure of advocacy on regulatory focus and attitude essentialism (see 
Figure 9.3). I controlled for valence, strength contributors, and morality.
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Figure 9.3. Study 3 test model, with multiple Y variable boxes representing separate analyses.
Power Analysis
In this study, I conducted fundamentally a 2x2 ANCOVA. Assuming a medium effect size 
(f = .25), to test main effects and interactions I would require a sample size of 128 participants. 
Assuming a small effect size (f = .10), I would require a sample size of 787 participants.
In an attempt to balance participant recruitment with the needs of the study, I planned 
to collect 400 responses. In order to detect every single main effect and interaction, this would 
provide me with an achieved power of .51, if all effect sizes are small. All analyses were 
conducted in G*Power 3.1.9.4 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007) and assume two-tailed analysis.
Hypotheses
I predicted that moral conviction would significantly predict advocacy intentions and 
observed (behavioral) advocacy. I believed it is theoretically supported that attitude 
essentialism will also have this effect, as the belief that attitudes are mutable will make 
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advocacy seem to have greater likely utility (Akhtar & Wheeler, 2016; see Bandura, 1997 for the
underlying processes of self-efficacy beliefs). Further, I believed that the effect of moral 
conviction on advocacy would be strongest in individuals who have undergone a prevention-
orientation manipulation, and that this interaction would interact with essentialism to result in 
prevention-oriented individuals advocating more on behalf of more moral attitudes when that 
attitude is seen as most related to their self, wherein dissenting others from difficult-to-
distance in-group (such as family) generate the most dissonance for one’s group identity, a 
reversal of the general main effect potentially found in the essentialism-advocacy relation.
Results
Attention Check
As in Studies 1 and 2, prior to analysis, I removed all responses that did not give the 
correct response to the attention check. Out of 547 total completed entries, 128 failed this 
check (the survey was reissued for more participants to take until the requisite number of 
participants passed this check. Some extra was acquired as the cap was raised excessively due 
to time constraints). As in study 2, apparent inattentive or non-answers to the open-ended 
response were removed from analyses utilizing that outcome (see Study 2, Behavioral Measure 
of Advocacy).
Willingness to Share/Persuade
Moral conviction, when tested against both frame manipulations, resulted in no 
significant effect on any intent to reactively nor proactively share one’s attitude with nor 
persuade others (see Appendix B, Table B.2.15.). Strength was the only significant predictor 
between strength, moral conviction, and frame, resulting in p values between 0.03 and <0.01.
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Moral okayness required use of valence as a covariate, due to its inherent directionality, 
however, it also resulted in models with only significant effects from strength (Appendix B, 
Table B.3.2).
Given the results of earlier studies indicating that morality may interact with basis, I ran 
an additional model including that as a possible interactor. While I likely had insufficient power 
to reliably find real effects, it seemed useful for the sake of future research to explore. This 
model included strength, both types of basis, both frames, and interactions of the latter four. 
As the four-way interaction was insignificant, I excluded that interaction term; the model up to 
three-way interactions may be seen in Appendix B, Table B.3.3.
The most suggestive results include a significant two-way effect of essentialist/non-
essentialist framing and cognitive basis on reactive persuading, proactive sharing, and proactive
persuading. Further, a three-way interaction of the same including affective basis reached or 
neared significance on the same variables (reactive persuading: t(416)=-1.88, p=0.06; proactive 
sharing: t(416)=-2.23, p=0.03); proactive persuading: t(416)=-1.62, p=0.106). For individuals 
with low affective basis, while under a nonessentialist frame, cognitive basis positively predicts 
reactive and proactive advocacy, under an essentialist frame, the inverse occurs (see Figure 9.4 
for a charting of this finding in proactive sharing). This would support the theory that an 
essentialist view may lead to decreased advocacy due to decreased perceived utility for 
individuals with high cognitive basis, when there is no high affective basis to compensate.
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Figure 9.4. Proactive sharing by cognitive basis for individuals under an essentialist or nonessentialist frame at 
levels of affective basis.
Also in this model, there was a significant two-way interaction of frame on reactive 
behavior (Figures 9.5-9.6).
Figure 9.5. Reactive sharing by essentialist/nonessentialist and promotion/prevention frames.
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Figure 9.6. Reactive sharing by essentialist/nonessentialist and promotion/prevention frames.
There is some evidence of a possible three-way interaction between both frames and 
cognitive basis (reactive sharing: t(416)=-4.20, p=0.02, Figures 9.8-9.9; reactive persuading: 
t(416)=-1.65, p=0.10), although the issue of power heightens my concern of validity. Both the 
two- and three-way interaction suggest that advocacy may be greater on average for those 
under a prevention frame, but especially those also under an essentialist frame, although the 
three-way interaction additionally suggests the effect may be greater when cognitive basis is 
low. This would be consistent with previous findings that high cognitive basis results in greater 
advocacy regardless.
109
Figure 9.7. Reactive sharing by promotion/prevention frame For those under a nonessentialist frame.
Figure 9.8. Reactive sharing by promotion/prevention frame For those under an essentialist frame.
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Behavioral Measure of Advocacy
Manipulations of frame also did not have significant effects on the behavioral measure 
of advocacy (see Appendix B, Tables B.3.4-B.3.5).
As before, given the results of earlier studies indicating that morality may interact with 
basis, I ran an additional model including bases as possible interactors. When no 4-way effect 
was found, I reduced the model by one level of interaction until a significant effect arose, 
ending up separating each frame into its own model in interaction with basis. Both models 
reached a fully reduced state of only basis and frame, in which only the essentialist frame bore 
out a significant effect; a two-way interaction of essentialist frame and affective basis 
significantly predicted length of the open-ended response (t(418)=2.52, p=0.01; Table 9.1). This 
method of reduction increases the chance of type 1 error as it increases the chance of 
overfitting, however, it suggests that further investigation of the supported effect may be 
warranted.
Table 9.1. Effect of affective basis and an essentialist or non-essentialist frame on a behavioral measure of 
advocacy.
 Length of Open-Ended Response
Predictors Estimate 95% CI Statistic p
Intercept 372.60 (306.56 – 438.63) 11.09 <0.001
Affective Basis -31.69 (-47.42 – -15.96) -3.96 <0.001
Essentialist Frame -86.04 (-152.08 – -20.00) -2.56 0.011
Essentialist Frame x 
Affective Basis
20.16 (4.43 – 35.88) 2.52 0.012
Observations 419
R2 / R2 adjusted 0.054 / 0.047
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Figure 9.9. Effect of affective basis and an essentialist or non-essentialist frame on a behavioral measure of 
advocacy.
Discussion
When subjected only to the planned analysis, my hypotheses regarding frame were not 
supported. Morality, or at least morality alone with strength and valence, seems insufficient to 
explain enough variance in attitudes to make frame valuable.
However, the work of Studies 1 and 2 informed Study 3 to the point that basis were 
incorporated into the model. With basis included, the data suggest that frame may have a 
significant effect on advocacy. However, the results are inconsistent between outcomes, as 
essentialism appears to suppress proactive behavior unless cognitive and affective basis are 
high, consistent with theories of decreased utility. Yet essentialism and prevention orientation 
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may together increase the likelihood to advocate reactively, especially in those with low 
cognitive basis who otherwise would not.
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CHAPTER 10.    SIGNIFICANCE
On Stimulus Sampling in Attitude Research
As scientists study attitudes, particularly in an environment that rewards low risk-taking 
through rigid hypothesis testing largely on homogenous groups of university students, it has 
become common to study attitudinal processes through topics of only moderate extremity. The
goal has been to have a reasonable distribution of scores without (or perhaps excluding) many 
outliers. However, this method of selecting moderate stimuli limits our understanding to only 
moderate attitudes. Further, as human idiosyncrasy, history effects, etc. interfere with our 
desired normal curve, the weakening influence of range restriction on our ability to detect 
potential real effects wastes valuable scientific effort.
I believe it would be for the betterment of attitude science to encourage stimulus 
sampling, and to tolerate variation in significance, with a respectful skepticism until we have 
sufficient samples to determine robustness.
On Morality as a Predictor of Advocacy
I found evidence that moral conviction and affect may combine to shut down proactive 
advocacy that would otherwise occur if affective basis were more moderate or moral conviction
were less extreme. This is a risk to knowledge sharing and idea growth in society, as 
unwillingness to discuss highly impactful topics in psychologically unsafe spaces may heighten 
‘echo chamber’ effects or increase attitude-driven identities through suppressing all sources of 
dissonance or alternatives.  In a note of optimism, I found that when the morality of a topic 
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varies by the degree to which is is or isn’t acceptable/okay rather than its abstract connection 
to values did not result in this suppression. If these are not simply separate constructs, but may 
be instead reframings of each other, optimistically we may be able to manipulate the perceived 
nature of morality and ease tensions.
Morality has a place in increasing discussion, as high morality, as long as it is not coupled
with maximum affect, does increase advocacy, including overcoming the suppressive social risk 
of a controversial topic.
On Essentialism and Regulatory Orientation as Influences on Advocacy
Through the course of these studies it has become clear that attitude basis is a key 
factor in advocacy, not replaceable by generalized morality. I found some evidence, but only in 
a posteriori analysis, that basis, essentialist views of attitudes, and prevention orientation may 
work together to influence rates of both reported willingness and actual observed advocacy.
However, it is worth noting that morality did not play significantly into any model 
containing frame manipulations. As the manipulations were intended to grasp some of the 
underlying processes that may influence an issue being perceived as moral, this may have been 
expected. However, without directly manipulation these aspects in the context of a specific 
topic and measuring any change in reported morality, it is unclear whether these frames negate
effects of morality or actually drive them, which should be pursued in future work.
Contributions to Theory
Dwyer (2009) argued that research on moral dumbfounding was limited by the 
conflation of acceptability and permissibility in research. While others have used measures that 
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either include both or draw a clearer distinction, the predictive value of these (questionably 
separate) concepts had not been established. I believe, in this work, that I have clarified that 
permissibility and acceptability do in fact have different value in predicting the established 
outcomes of moral conviction.
Skitka noted that individuals often select one or a few topics on which to have 
passionate moral stances, but do not extend that stance to every related issue. She argued that 
people use these stances as a form of self-presentation or identity construction (2002). The 
self-related nature of moral attitudes is supported by this work, in that a manipulation of 
attitudinal relevancy of the self-concept resulted in increased advocacy as moral conviction did. 
More suggestively, high beliefs in essentialism in some circumstances had the same suppressive
impact as maximal moral conviction.
Further, although research thus far has often focused on individual behavior (e.g. Skitka,
2010; Skitka & Bauman, 2008), social withdrawal (e.g. intolerance: Cole Wright et al., 2008), 
and/or collective action measures that may imply action not only for the group but as a group 
(e.g. Zaal, Va Laar, Ståhl, & Ellemers, 2011), there had been very little to establish how well 
these attitudes and attitude factors affect explicitly 1-on-1 approach behaviors (direct person-
to-person advocacy). As this type of behavior has the highest social risk, it holds the highest 
theoretical value in finding what elements of an attitude, when strong enough, overcome that 
risk. In this work, I have demonstrated that direct person-to-person advocacy is subject the 
same positive relationship with morality. However, it may be suppressed by high 
controversiality or enhanced by majority status, especially at closer levels of social distance; 
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social context becomes more relevant to the study of moral attitudes as the degree of social 
risk increases.
Finally, by manipulating the perceived essentialism and immutability of attitudes, I am 
contributing to a body of studies of incremental and entity views of self, or in Dweck’s 
terminology, growth vs. fixed mindsets (Dweck, 2015; Dweck, 2012; Dweck, 2008). These views 
of mindsets have already been shown to be manipulable (e.g. Yeager, et al., 2016; Dweck, 2014)
however, in this study we saw the effects of that manipulation not on the self or future 
behavior, but the intervening attitudes that guide that behavior (a la The Theory of Planned 
Behavior; Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen, 1985).
This set of studies not only contributes to psychological theory on multiple levels, but 
also is directly related to social issues of the day. As our societies wrestle with questions of 
violence, vaccination, punishment for lawbreaking, etc., the effects of moral judgment are 
highly relevant to not only our understanding of why people answer these questions the way 
that they do, but also what makes them spread their opinion to others, and what may shut 
down the discussion entirely.
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CHAPTER 11.    FUTURE WORK
I believe there are several avenues of work stemming from this research that should be 
continued.
First, the thread of basis interacting with other factors was not originally an intended 
focus of this work. The nature of the relationship between affective and cognitive basis should 
be studied via explicit manipulations of these bases regarding a specific attitude.
If possible, it would be ideal to manipulate basis vs. morality. However, as the cause of 
morality remains unclear, another line of research lies in the relationship between the 
theoretically possible underpinnings of morality, such as threat (and/or regulatory orientation) 
or the self (that is, mutability of, or efficacy beliefs). It should be determined whether 
manipulating these constructs in the context of a specific attitude may actually change the 
perceived morality of that attitude. Following that and other investigations into possible 
sources of morality, morality may be manipulated in time with basis in order to test for true 
causal interactions. 
Finally, although in this work I have ventured into the world of secondary, rather than 
primary, persuasion effects (the viral effect), the identity of the secondary target (he who one is
advocating to) remains undefined. As an intelligent advocate with a theory of mind, I must have
some pre-existing beliefs about the nature of my target. Group relations and attribution 
theories would suggest that some of those beliefs about those who disagree with me, outgroup
members, involve judgements of their own basis for attitudes, and likelihood of changing. I 
believe there is almost certainly striking interactions between a source of advocacy and their 
target that has yet to be explored.
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● Upon completion of the project, transfer of IRB oversight to another IRB, or departure of the PI 
and/or Supervising Investigator, please initiate a Project Closure in IRBManager to officially close
the project.  For information on instances when a study may be closed, please refer to the IRB 
Study Closure Policy.    
Please don’t hesitate to contact us if you have questions or concerns at 515-294-4566 or 
IRB@iastate.edu. 
Study 3
                       
Date: 10/29/2019
To: Ann Lewis Kevin Blankenship, PhD
From: Office for Responsible Research
Title: Gun Control Attitudes in the United States
IRB ID: 19-467
Submission Type: Initial Submission Exemption Date:   10/29/2019
Institutional Review Board
Office for Responsible Research
Vice President for Research 
2420 Lincoln Way, Suite 202
Ames, Iowa 50014
515 294-4566
142
The project referenced above has been declared exempt from most  requirements of the human subject
protections regulations as described in 45 CFR 46.104 or 21 CFR 56.104 because it meets the following 
federal requirements for exemption:
2018 - 2 (ii): Research that only includes interactions involving educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, 
aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of public behavior 
(including visual or auditory recording) when any disclosure of the human subjects’ responses outside 
the research would not reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging 
to the subjects’ financial standing, employability, educational advancement, or reputation.
2018 - 3 (i.B): Research involving benign behavioral interventions in conjunction with the collection of 
information from an adult subject through verbal or written responses or audiovisual recording when 
the subject prospectively agrees to the intervention and information collection and any disclosure of the
human subjects’ responses outside the research would not reasonably place the subjects at risk of 
criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects’ financial standing, employability, education 
advancement, or reputation. - 3 (ii) If research involves deception, it is prospectively authorized by the 
subject.
The determination of exemption means that:
● You do not need to submit an application for continuing review.  Instead, you will receive a 
request for a brief status update every three years.  The status update is intended to verify 
that the study is still ongoing.
● You must carry out the research as described in the IRB application.  Review by IRB staff is 
required prior to implementing modifications that may change the exempt status of the 
research.  In general, review is required for any modifications to the research procedures (e.g., 
method of data collection, nature or scope of information to be collected, nature or duration of 
behavioral interventions,  use of deception, etc.), any change in privacy or confidentiality 
protections, modifications that result in the inclusion of participants from vulnerable 
populations, removing plans for informing participants about the study, any change that may 
increase the risk or discomfort to participants, and/or any change such that the revised 
procedures do not fall into one or more of the regulatory exemption categories. The purpose of 
review is to determine if the project still meets the federal criteria for exemption.  
 
● All changes to key personnel must receive prior approval. 
● Promptly inform the IRB of any addition of or change in federal funding for this study.  
Approval of the protocol referenced above applies only to funding sources that are specifically 
identified in the corresponding IRB application. 
Detailed information about requirements for submitting modifications for exempt research can 
be found on our website.  For modifications that require prior approval, an amendment to the 
most recent IRB application must be submitted in IRBManager.  A determination of exemption or 
approval from the IRB must be granted before implementing the proposed changes.
Non-exempt research is subject to many regulatory requirements that must be addressed prior to 
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implementation of the study.   Conducting non-exempt research without IRB review and approval 
may constitute non-compliance with federal regulations and/or academic misconduct according to
ISU policy.
Additionally:
● All research involving human participants must be submitted for IRB review. Only the IRB or its 
designees may make the determination of exemption, even if you conduct a study in the future
that is exactly like this study.
● Please inform the IRB if the Principal Investigator and/or Supervising Investigator end their 
role or involvement with the project with sufficient time to allow an alternate PI/Supervising 
Investigator to assume oversight responsibility.  Projects must have an eligible PI to remain 
open.
● Immediately inform the IRB of (1) all serious and/or unexpected adverse experiences involving
risks to subjects or others; and (2) any other unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects 
or others.
● Approval from other entities may also be needed.  For example, access to data from private 
records (e.g., student, medical, or employment records, etc.) that are protected by FERPA, 
HIPAA or other confidentiality policies requires permission from the holders of those records.  
Similarly, for research conducted in institutions other than ISU (e.g., schools, other colleges or 
universities, medical facilities, companies, etc.), investigators must obtain permission from the 
institution(s) as required by their policies.  An IRB determination of exemption in no way 
implies or guarantees that permission from these other entities will be granted.
● Your research study may be subject to post-approval monitoring by Iowa State University’s 
Office for Responsible Research.  In some cases, it may also be subject to formal audit or 
inspection by federal agencies and study sponsors.
● Upon completion of the project, transfer of IRB oversight to another IRB, or departure of the PI 
and/or Supervising Investigator, please initiate a Project Closure in IRBManager to officially close
the project.  For information on instances when a study may be closed, please refer to the IRB 
Study Closure Policy.    
Please don’t hesitate to contact us if you have questions or concerns at 515-294-4566 or 
IRB@iastate.edu. 
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